By Vincent J. Curtis
The Normandy campaign concluded at the end of August, 1944, after the Germans were almost entirely cleared from France and the 1st Canadian Army was advancing into Belgium. Many “lessons learned” have been written about the campaign, but what can be said about it from the perspective of 75 years on?
In a “what-if” scenarios, let’s ask, “what if the Canadian Army had been equipped with the Mk I Centurion tank?” This thought experiment isn’t all that far-fetched, as the Centurion was fielded in May, 1945. It was on the design boards in early 1943. What would have happened if the Canadian Army had been equipped with Centurions and its 20 pdr gun, in Normandy?
It is likely that the 2nd Canadian Corps would have torn through the German army like a chainsaw through softwood. One of the main reasons the Germans were able to hold their own for so long in Normandy was their superiority in tanks, in particular the Panther and the Tiger. These tanks could, and usually did, defeat large numbers of Shermans from long range. The 75 mm gun on the Sherman couldn’t penetrate the frontal armour of a Tiger even from point-blank range, while the long-barreled German 75 mm and 88 mm guns could brew up a Sherman from over a mile away.
Canadian armour was getting beaten in detail by these superior German weapons – in those little battles that occur within the larger one. The Canadians did not have quickly to hand the means of defeating Panthers and Tigers. What was in their hands was the British 17 pdr gun, which could defeat Panthers and Tigers from long range. The 6 pdr anti-tank gun with which infantry battalions were equipped was useless except for close range side-shots. The PIAT anti-tank projector had an effective warhead – if you could crawl within a hundred yards of the target and hit the thing.
The only tank that could tackle a Tiger or a Panther was a Sherman Firefly, a Sherman which mounted that 17 pdr gun.
Tac Air, in the shape of formations of Typhoons, were effective against Tigers and Panthers, but the ground troops were not equipped with ground to air radio sets, making close cooperation impossible.
The Canadians in Normandy were losing four and five Shermans for every Panther and Triger killed. If that ratio were dead even, or two to one in our favor, the Germans could not have held up the Canadian advance for nearly as long as they did.
What lesson can be drawn from this ‘what-if’ scenario? The immediate lesson is that Canadian combat troops have to have in their hands the best, most modern equipment to deal with the enemy. Not just the best that we can think of, but equal if not better than what the enemy has. Everybody knew about Tigers since March, 1943. So, why weren’t our generals and our engineers trying to figure out ways of dealing with these new battlefield tactical problems?
Was Clarence Decatur Howe working day and night? No. Did engineer MacNaughton look at the bazooka and see a 106 mm recoilless rifle? No. Was Crerar hounding Howe for a new weapon? No. Why weren’t Crerar and Simonds developing TTPs (tactics, techniques, procedures) for ground troops to defeat these menaces? Being generals, they ought to know something about ground combat. They ought to know before their battalion commanders the tactical problems their platoons are going to face.
As recently as 2006, it was seriously proposed by our generals that we didn’t need tanks anymore and that the new doctrine of ‘maneuver warfare’ would overcome any tactical problem. No replacement for the Leopard I’s were in prospect during the Chretien years, and rather than embarrass the government, our generals put out the superior doctrine story – even though Genforce employed tanks and maneuver warfare doctrine already!
The need to put into Canadian hands equipment that is not just the best, but better than what the enemy has is one lesson from the Normandy campaign. There are others like TTPs.
