By Vincent J. Curtis

On Wednesday, July 24, Russian and Chinese bombers together entered the Alaskan Air Defense Identification Zone, approaching to within about 320 kilometers of the American coast.Though the aircraft, identified as two Russian T-95 (Bear) and two Chinese H-6 bombers, remained in international airspace, this new show of force and demonstration of expanding military cooperation has the United States concerned. The bombers were tracked by NORAD, and intercepted by U.S. and Canadian fighter jets. But it was the first time that Chinese bomber aircraft have flown that close to Alaska.

China and Russia both acknowledged what they called a joint patrol over the Bering Sea.

Chinese naval ships have appeared near Alaska in international waters, as recently as mid-Jul, 2024, when four Chinese ships were spotted in the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone, which extends 200 nautical miles (370 kilometers) from the shore.

The United States has become so concerned about the broadening China-Russia military cooperation that they released a new strategy document on June 21, 2024, entitled 2024 Arctic Strategy. The United States military sees the Arctic as a “strategically important region for the United States.” The United States is content to see the status in the Arctic region remain quo; and hence views Russian and especially Chinese efforts to change the economic and military balance in the High Arctic with skepticism. The High Arctic is portrayed as a vulnerable northern flank of NATO and of the United States; and activities there could divert U.S. military efforts from more decisive places elsewhere, “threaten the ability of the United States to project power both to Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, constraining [US] ability to respond to crises.”

Threats in the High Arctic can become direct threats to the U.S. homeland which demand military protection. The Arctic Ocean provides a route for Russian nuclear submarines to quickly get close to the U.S. mainland before firing nuclear missiles. Those familiar with the geography will see that that means the Russian subs have to enter sovereign Canadian Arctic waters, sailing as far south, possibly, as James Bay.

The Russian threat has long been known, but China could play the joker in the deck. China is the potential alteration to the current balance of power in the Arctic. “The PRC includes the Arctic in its long-term planning and seeks to increase its influence and activities in the region. Though not an Arctic nation, the PRC is attempting to leverage changing dynamics in the Arctic to pursue greater influence and access, take advantage of Arctic resources, and play a larger role in regional governance.

“The PRC seeks to bolster its operational expertise in the Arctic, where its presence, while limited, is increasing. The PRC operates three icebreakers—the Xue Long, Xue Long 2, and Zhong Shan Da Xue Ji Di—which enable the PRC’s dual civil-military research efforts in the Arctic. Over the course of the PRC’s 13 Arctic research expeditions to date, the vessels have tested unmanned underwater vehicles and polar-capable fixed-wing aircraft, among other activities. People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels have also demonstrated the capability and intent to operate in and around the Arctic region through exercises alongside the Russian Navy over the past several years.”

In April, Canada released a new defense policy, Naked and Afraid, in which defense of the High Arctic justified increasing defense spending to reach, with difficulty, 1.79 percent of GDP. If only someone in the Trudeau government took defense seriously, Canada could take on the role of being the guardian of NATO’s (i.e. America’s) northern flank. Canadian defense doves can console themselves with the thought that a vigorous Canadian defense effort in the High Arctic would protect Canadian sovereignty from three threats: from China, Russia, and from the United States, who will not respect Canadian sovereignty if the U.S. must project the power of its Joint Force because Canada can’t handle the threats posed by the other two countries.

“Although the vast majority of the Arctic is under the jurisdiction of sovereign states, the PRC seeks to promote the Arctic region as a ‘global commons’ in order to shift Arctic governance in its favor. The PRC’s 2018 Arctic Policy claims non-Arctic states should contribute to the region’s “shared future for mankind” due to the Arctic’s global significance. Its “Polar Silk Road” has been used to gain a footing in the Arctic by pursuing investments in infrastructure and natural resources, including in the territory of NATO Allies.” The Chinese policy is a direct threat to Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic.

The U.S. is content for now to “monitor and respond” to threats as they occur at present.

“Insufficient investments in early warning and air defense sensors in the Arctic will increase risks to the U.S. homeland. A lack of Arctic-capable domain awareness and communications capabilities would hamper the U.S. military’s ability to operate in the region in response to competitor activities.” Complementing these needs of the U.S. dovetails well within the aims of Naked and Afraid, and ought to spur serious pursuit of the strategic aims and spending priorities of the new defense policy.