Canadian Forces being left behind as it dithers on new technology

A Canadian Forces soldier trains Ukrainian troops in the use of drones, a somewhat ironic situation since Ukraine has become a world leader in drone warfare. (DND photo)

By David Pugliese

In November 2024 I started writing an article on first person view (FPV) drones and the Canadian Armed Forces.

I figured the piece would be a good news story for the Ottawa Citizen newspaper about how the CAF was embracing the FPV technology that was revolutionizing warfare.

Afterall, FPV drones are now dominating battlefields. They were being used in fighting in Gaza and Lebanon and had become a critical enabler for both sides of the Ukraine-Russia conflict.

The first person view (FPV) drones allow the pilot to see from the drone’s perspective in real-time, usually through a headset. The low-cost systems, which are in some cases are as cheap as $500, can bring devastating firepower to the battlefield. Social media is full of videos showing explosive-laden FPVs knocking out multi-million dollar weapons, including main battle tanks.

Intelligence analyst Wesley Wark has outlined how such drone technology was “transforming warfare in real time,” adding that Ukraine uses FPV drones to drop munitions down Russian tank hatches and chase individual soldiers and small units on the battlefield.

But I didn’t expect the response I got from the Canadian Forces on FPVs.

“At this time, the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces does not have any current or planned procurements for First Person View drones for operational use,” department spokesperson Alex Tétreault explained in an email.

End of story. FPVs were not even being considered by the CAF. Nor were there any plans whatsoever to go down the FPV road, even in an experimental way.

One would have thought a FPV purchase would be easy. As explained, they are cheap enough so a major procurement program wouldn’t be needed. They are high-tech, allowing the military and government to send a message they are continuing to keep pace with new designs and weapons.

Canada’s ally Ukraine has been cranking out thousands of the devices a month- it needs hard currency to keep the war effort going so there could have been a direct link to support Ukraine financially with an order of their defence products. (It is somewhat ironic that the CAF recently put on its Combat Camera website a photo of a Canadian Forces soldier training Ukrainian troops in the use of small drones. Ukraine has become a world-leader in such weapons).

The U.S. defence industry is building FPVs as well. In fact, the U.S. Army has been conducting experiments with FPVs with a plan to have a program in place next year and the first units equipped with the systems by 2026.

How do you explain the failure of CAF to embrace FPV technology? Defence sources pointed out the past and current CAF leadership has been dismal in understanding how quickly war- and the technology of war – changes. It is a leadership linked to the past, not future innovation.

That was abundantly clear in the second part of the CAF response on FPVs.

“In Our North Strong and Free (strategy) we committed to exploring options for acquiring a suite of surveillance and strike drones as well as counter-drone capabilities, sometime in the future,” the CAF statement read.

Sometime in the future?

That is in reference to the General Atomics MQ-9B Reapers that Canada plans to purchase. The federal government announced on Dec. 19, 2023, that Canada would buy 11 of those remotely piloted aircraft for $2.5 billion.

The drones were originally expected to be delivered in 2025, but that will be delayed until 2028 as modifications are made to the aircraft to deal with Arctic conditions.

DND posted on the social media site X on Jan. 10 that the first two MQ-9B drones were in production at a U.S. company in California. In its posting, the department called the news “exciting progress.”

But then there was a kicker. DND also confirmed that those unmanned aircraft won’t be fully operational until 2033.

Why?

DND won’t say.

But some military observers were also pointing out the obvious. By the time the MQ-9B fleet is fully operational- almost a decade from now - its technology will be obsolete.

Foreign militaries, will by then, have gone in different directions for such robotic technology. Future drone systems will increasingly rely on artificial intelligence to become truly autonomous weapons and will be used in swarm attacks to overwhelm defences, analysts like Wesley Wark have pointed out.

It is becoming obvious that CAF and DND are also being left behind on the drone swarm development.

On Jan. 15, 2025, Swedish Minister for Defense Pal Jonson announced at a press conference that his country was going to be using swarm aerial drones in support of ground units.  As noted by the U.S. publication Defense News, the Swedes released a video showing a formation of 10 quadcopters taking off and relaying footage of their flight trajectory to ground operators. The swarm of 10 can be controlled by a single operator.

Ukraine is also doing more research on drone swarms. It has already acknowledged deploying groups of three to 10 drones at a time but wants to expand that capability.

Russia has focused much of its technology development on deploying decoy drones as part of its strategy to deceive Ukrainian air defence crews. Codenamed Operation False Target, the decoys are launched along with regular drones, making it difficult to determine which of the robotic aircraft are armed and which are not.

In addition, Russia has developed new drones capable of carrying thermobaric weapons. As reported by the Associated Press the thermobaric warheads create a vortex of high pressure and heat that can penetrate thick walls, causing death and significant injuries to those on the ground.

In contrast, the Canadian Forces has not conducted any experiments with small drones or quad-copters dropping munitions. Instead it is focused on its more traditional MQ-9s that are on order from General Atomics, a U.S. firm. Those will be able to carry different weapons, including 250- and 500-pound bombs as well as “low collateral damage” bombs, according to the DND briefing on the Remotely Piloted Aircraft System program.

(It should be noted, however, that the CAF and Defence Research and Development Canada has focused efforts on counter-drone technology. Those have included tests of systems provided by industry which utilize lasers, guns, and ultrasonic waves to deal with drones).

But it isn’t just FPVs and offensive drone swarms that the CAF and DND leadership has ignored. Canadian firms are among those on the cutting edge for over-the-horizon long-range radar but are largely being ignored by the federal government and military.

Both the U.S. and Canada have announced they will be building over-the-horizon radar systems to provide long-range surveillance of threats to North America. The Canadian portion of the over-the-horizon radar project, part of the NORAD modernization effort, is valued at least $1 billion.

There are currently two companies in the world that have actually delivered a system that could potentially fit the bill for the project; BAE Australia and D-TA Systems Inc. of Ottawa.

D-TA Systems, which has 40 employees, has already briefed U.S. military officials several times about its over-the-horizon radar technology. In addition, it recently delivered a working radar to Defence Research and Development Canada.

D-TA Systems Inc. was established in 2007 and has been involved in defence projects in the U.S., Canada and other NATO nations as well as Japan. The firm has been working on over-the-horizon radar since 2011 for various Department of National Defence and U.S. military projects. DND has already spent $30 million on the initiative but hasn’t acted on procuring a full-size system.

The Pentagon is building its own test system in the Pacific in the Republic of Palau. That radar, expected to be operating by 2026, will be a scaled-down version of an over-the-horizon radar. The proposed U.S. system is smaller than the radar that D-TA recently delivered to DRDC.

D-TA is advocating for its technology, financed by Canadian taxpayers, to play a key role in the radar projects but the jury is out on whether the company will be successful.

For further reading and viewing check out this Esprit de Corps article as well as On Target:

https://www.espritdecorps.ca/feature/shotguns-versus-drones-new-methods-to-deal-with-small-uavs

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4tSKj-xfIyE

What is Happening With Canada’s Spike Missile Procurement?

Slovenian soldiers fire the Spike LR anti-tank missile. (US Dept. of Defense photo)

By David Pugliese

On Nov. 26 the National Post newspaper reported that Canada was having problems with its recently ordered Spike anti-tank missiles.

There had been suggestions in the House of Commons that the missiles weren’t accurate.

Rafale, the manufacturer of the Spike LR2 missiles, has not responded to requests for comment.

During the Nov. 28 Standing Committee on National Defence, procurement minister Jean-Yves Duclos did not answer questions about the ongoing problems. Instead he pointed to the Liberal government’s commitment to procuring new equipment for the Canadian Forces.

So what is happening?

Here is what we know so far.

More than half of the new anti-tank missiles provided to the Canadian military during initial testing didn’t function properly, the Department of National Defence has confirmed.

The federal government spent U.S. $32 million ($45 million Canadian) to purchase Spike anti-tank missiles for use by Canadian Forces personnel in Latvia. The deal also includes simulators. DND spokesman Kened Sadiku noted that “Due to operational security, the total number of units to be acquired cannot be disclosed.”

The National Post did report that DND is considering cancelling the Spike contract.

But as I reported in the Ottawa Citizen, DND spokesman Nick Drescher Brown said that is not true; the contract with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, an Israeli company, is still in place.

But DND has acknowledged ongoing problems with the Spike LR2 missiles.

“During Initial Cadre Training conducted by the company on July 15-16, 2024, five out of eight missiles experienced functionality issues,” Drescher Brown confirmed to the Ottawa Citizen. “We continue to work closely with the equipment manufacturer to identify and address the root cause of these issues.”

Drescher Brown did not go into detail about the specific problems affecting the missiles. But he noted that no one was injured nor were there any safety concerns associated with the firings. “All safety protocols built into the equipment performed exactly as expected,” he added.

In February 2023, the Ottawa Citizen reported that the Canadian Army was fast-tracking its purchase of the anti-tank weapons as well as air defence systems for troops stationed in Latvia. The equipment was classified as an Urgent Operational Requirement, the same process used during the Afghanistan war to quickly obtain gear without going through the slower traditional procurement procedures.

Drescher Brown said in the interest of getting the new missiles quickly for the Latvia mission, no live-fire tests or demonstrations were performed during the selection process. “This technical risk was assessed and deemed acceptable as all of the potential bidders had delivered thousands of units of this product to other customers by that point in time,” he added.

This is indeed accurate. Both Spike and Javelin missiles are in service with multiple nations. Javelin has been used extensively in Ukraine while Spike variants have been used in conflicts in Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon and during the second Nagorno-Karabakh war.

The ongoing issues with Spike affect both the missiles and launchers.

“While deliveries of these new systems for deployed Canadian Battle Group members in Latvia has been delayed slightly, until the equipment manufacturer implements the required changes to ensure that these systems function as intended, full operational capability remains on schedule for January 2026,”  Drescher Brown added.

No details were provided by DND on when the needed changes for the Spike systems are expected to be completed.

Once the issues are ironed out, the missiles would be a welcome addition to the Canadian Army arsenal. The SPIKE LR2 is an advanced state-of-the-art fifth generation multipurpose multi-platform missile. The LR2 has enhanced engagement range; enhanced lethality as well as weight reduction in both of the missile and the launcher.

For the enhanced lethality the LR2 includes two warhead configurations: a tandem HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) warhead configuration, improving the armour penetration capability by more than 30 per cent; and a new multipurpose blast warhead that includes controlled fusing for regulating the desired effect, according to the company that produces the system. The system’s operator can select a “breach mode” - the new warhead can breach up to 20 centimetres of reinforced concrete and detonate within the structure.

National Defence referred to the anti-tank missile acquisition as being for a Portable Anti “X” Missile.  “The “X” name in Portable Anti “X” Missile was created by the Canadian Army to represent the capability of this weapon system and its effectiveness against armoured vehicles, buildings and structures as well as combatants. X is used to refer to its multiple capabilities, including anti-armour, anti-structure and anti-personnel.” 

The request for Proposal for the PAXM UOR did not have specific Canadian Content Policy or Industrial and Technological Benefits (ITB) Policy requirements. As a result there are no contractual requirements for Rafale to leverage Canadian firms for the completion of this contract, according to DND. They may choose to invest or leverage Canadian firms as they see fit, however there is no obligation to report it through the duration. 

The Ukraine war has highlighted Canada’s gap in modern anti-tank weapons. In news media interviews at the beginning of the conflict, retired Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier complained about the Canadian Army’s reliance on aging Carl Gustaf anti-tank systems and its lack of modern anti-tank weapons.

What Hillier neglected to mention was that when he was CDS, the then Liberal government had approved $194 million for the purchase of either the Javelin or the Spike missile systems. Companies put their bids in to provide 840 missiles and more than 100 firing systems. Test firings of both weapons was conducted. But a year later the bids were rejected as the Army claimed it didn’t have enough information to figure out whether the weapons would be effective on the battlefield. This decision was made despite the fact that both systems were already fielded in other militaries and reportedly effective. In the end, the Canadian anti-tank missile project went by the wayside.

Further reading:

https://defenceobserver.ca

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/dnd-canadian-forces-anti-tank-missiles-latvia

Twitter: @davidpugliese

Canadian Forces Air Defence Procurement Moves Forward, DND says

The Royal Canadian Air Force transports U.S. air defence equipment during exercises (US Defense Dept. photo)

By Tim Ryan

On Nov. 21, 2024, analyst Richard Shimooka wrote in the online publication, the Hub, that “National Defence recently announced it was canceling the ground-based air defence program – a key army modernization priority.”

That is a pretty significant decision and blow to the troops….if it were true.

Except it isn’t, according to the Canadian Armed Forces and National Defence.

(It is unclear why Shimooka, the Macdonald Laurier Institute and the Hub falsely claimed that Ground Based Air Defence or GBAD was cancelled but they have in the past written/distributed incorrect information about defence issues).

So what is actually happening with the GBAD procurement?

The Canadian Armed Forces or CAF is prioritizing its efforts to focus on getting air defence as quickly as possible for its troops in Latvia and the region (Operation Reassurance). So it is restructuring its GBAD initiative into different phases.

In the face of continued Russian aggression in Ukraine, Canada intends to first address Operation Reassurance’s urgent need for a short-range air defence system that will be able to deal with incoming rockets, artillery and mortar rounds, according to an Oct. 10 notice to defence firms. It will continue to work with companies on the technical details for the new equipment. “The intention is to procure a nearly Military Off The Shelf system with very little Canada specific modifications and changes,” added the government message to companies.

Canada has already acquired man-portable surface-to-air missiles for the Latvia mission.

Once the purchase of the short-range air defence battery for Latvia is completed (phase 1), the procurement team will then turn its attention to the purchase of more extensive ground-based air defence systems for the rest of the military as outlined in phases 2 and 3, noted an article in the Ottawa Citizen.

DND spokesperson Nick Drescher Brown explained some of the key points of the phased process:

--“The introduction of Phase 1 represents an additional Battery of SHORAD equipment, but the high-level requirements of this system remain the same.  The requirement refinement process for Phase 1 will focus on Military Off the Shelf systems that are readily available to support OP REASSURANCE, which may result in a different capability than that which will be defined for the enduring solutions of Phases 2 and 3.”

--"Breaking the project into phases was necessary to address the army's priority. Breaking the project into phases  and accelerating the Phase 1 procurement will result in a better alignment with the army's immediate priorities while maintaining the integrity of the original GBAD project scope so that the project can balance the needs of OP REASSURANCE (Phase 1)  with a focus on best value and long term sustainment for the army's enduring GBAD capability (Phase 2 and 3).

-“Project resources will resume Phase 2 definition work once the Phase 1 RFP is released for tender.  The Phase 2 schedule will be further refined as part of industry engagements.  The project cost range for Phases 2 and 3 combined remain within the $500M - 1B previously advertised. The sequencing of Phase 3 follows the same rationale as that for Phase 2 and therefore still being refined.”

Now that this project is under way, or at least being planned and worked on, it is worth remembering a little history of air defence for the Canadian Forces.

The Canadian Army was outfitted in 1989 with a then state-of-the art air defence anti-tank system known as ADATS. It was purchased to protect bases in Germany against attack by the Russians, but, shortly after ADATS was delivered, the Cold War ended and the systems were shipped back to Canada. ADATS was occasionally used for domestic security, including to provide protection from potential air threats during the G8 summit in Alberta in 2002.

But after a series of budget cuts, the Canadian Army decided to shed its the ground based air defence capability. In 2005, the Army determined that the primary role of ADATS was “to be direct fire” with air defence a secondary role.

But the Army’s efforts to dump GBAD were met with serious concern, particularly in the Royal Canadian Air Force. The office of then Maj.-Gen. Charles Bouchard tried to push back against the Army, according to 2005 documents obtained by Esprit de Corps.

“While understood and not unexpected, this planned reduction in GBAD capability is happening at a time when the asymmetric threat and associated response dictates that the requirement for such a capability remains valid,” Bouchard’s office responded in a 2005 briefing note for the Canadian Army.

While the Army commander saw little need to maintain GBAD for an expeditionary role, Bouchard’s office countered with the following: “This capability does have a utility from both a NORAD and a domestic operations perspective.”

In fact, during a May 2005 NORAD planning conference, the joint U.S.-Canadian air defence command had identified the requirement “for a rapidly deployable” air defence capability for national special security events or important gatherings such as a G8 conference, according to the records.

But the RCAF’s concerns only delayed the inevitable. Almost all ADATS were declared surplus, and except for a few units for testing and support, the GBAD capability all but disappeared in 2012.

But, faced with budget cuts ordered by the Conservative government, the Army announced it was removing ADATS from service in 2012.

The move left the Canadian Forces without a primary air defence system. Army officers acknowledged at the time that decision was risky, but the service had determined it was acceptable in the short term. The Army had plans to introduce a new air defence system around 2017, but that project never went forward.

Further reading:

https://defenceobserver.ca

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-military-air-defence-system-latvia

Shipbuilding efforts focus on new submarines and icebreakers

South Korean companies are interested in bidding on the Canadian submarine program. (Hanwha Ocean photo)

By David Pugliese

Canada’s focus for shipbuilding programs has now shifted to new icebreakers and submarines.

Canada, Finland and the U.S. outlined on Nov. 13 at a special meeting in Washington a new plan for co-operation on the construction of icebreakers.

Jean-Yves Duclos, Canada’s Minister of Public Services and Procurement, Alejandro Mayorkas, United States Secretary of Homeland Security, and Wille Rydman, Finland's Minister of Economic Affairs, signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding to establish the Icebreaker Collaboration Effort (ICE Pact).

The pact is being described by Canadian government officials as a “landmark partnership” that will enhance industry collaboration among the three countries as well as coordinate expertise and strengthen abilities to produce best-in-class polar vessels, including icebreakers.

The ICE Pact will allow new equipment and capabilities to be produced more quickly, according to Public Services and Procurement Canada.

This includes setting up a system to rapidly exchange information on these icebreakers, keeping construction cost-and- time efficient.

Through the ICE Pact, Canada, the U.S. and Finland will also work together on a joint workforce-development program to ensure that the workers building these vessels have the skills and training that are needed.

By jointly developing and producing world-class Arctic and polar icebreakers, the nations are laying the foundation for a competitive shipbuilding industry, according to the Canadian government.

The Liberal government is also highlighting this increased cooperation as an initiative to “create thousands of good middle-class jobs”, grow the economy, empower scientific research, and help uphold security and sovereignty in the Arctic.

Diane Lebouthillier, Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard,

stated that the increased information sharing and joint learning opportunities through the ICE Pact will “help us ensure we're building the highest- quality polar icebreakers for our future Canadian Coast Guard fleet."

Canadian shipyards will continue building polar icebreakers and other Arctic and polar capabilities under the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS).

“By working together, we are supporting national security and climate interests in the Arctic for the collective benefit of all three countries," Duclos added.

The Canadian Coast Guard currently has 18 icebreakers of varying sizes and capabilities, making it the second-largest icebreaking fleet in the world.

The information and best practices that Canada, the U.S. and Finland gain through the ICE Pact will also help inform current and future work on icebreaking capabilities built under the National Shipbuilding Strategy.

In May 2021, Canada announced the construction of two new polar icebreakers under the NSS at Seaspan's Vancouver Shipyards Co. Ltd. and Chantier Davie Canada Inc. Both polar icebreakers will have capacity and abilities beyond those of Canada's current largest icebreaker, the Canadian Coast Guard Ship Louis S. St-Laurent.

U.S. Homeland Security officials noted that the ICE Pact includes four components:  1) enhanced information exchange between the United States, Canada, and Finland; 2) workforce development collaboration; 3) engagement with allies and partners, and; 4) research and development. “Given the high costs of shipbuilding, long-term orders are essential for shipyard success in each of our countries,” the U.S. agency pointed out. ”The collective investment in our domestic shipyards has the potential to scale production and reduce the cost of Arctic and polar icebreakers for our own use and for our allies and partners.”

Due to the capital intensity of shipbuilding, long-term, multi-ship orderbooks are essential to the success of a shipyard, the White House pointed out in its original July statement with the initial announcement of the ICE Pact.

As yards in the United States, Canada, and Finland make significant investments in their domestic capacity to build these vessels for their own needs, ICE Pact invites allies and partners to purchase vessels from American, Canadian, and Finnish shipyards with experience building polar icebreakers, the White House added.

Through diplomatic collaboration, shipyards focused on building polar icebreakers can reach the scale needed to reduce costs for allies and partners that need access to the polar regions, Canada, the U.S. and Finland noted.

To coincide with the signing of the ICE Pact MOU announcement, Davie, the Quebec-based shipbuilder, reaffirmed its commitment as an industry partner in the initiative.

Davie noted that as the only ICE Pact shipbuilder with a dedicated presence in all three member nations, it is uniquely positioned to bridge the critical gap in western icebreaking capacity.

Currently holding the largest global order book for heavy icebreakers under Canada's National Shipbuilding Strategy, Davie is also the owner of Helsinki Shipyard in Finland. That firm, purchased by Davie in November 2023, is responsible for over half of the world's icebreaking fleet. Furthermore, Davie will soon establish a U.S. shipbuilding presence, further solidifying its role across the ICE Pact countries, company officials noted.

Final site and partner selection for the move has still to be announced. But Davie’s initiative had earlier caught the attention of the White House which issued a July 29 statement highlighting the move. “Throughout its history, Davie has also supported American shipbuilders on strategic projects such as the U.S. Navy Nimitz Class Aircraft Carriers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers,” the White House noted in its praise for the company. “Davie seeks to collaborate with U.S. partners to support the growth of American shipbuilding capacity.”

Davie is in the process of positioning itself as a critical link in the production of icebreakers not only for Canada but the world. The firm also pointed out that as a partner under the NSS, it has an initial $8.5 billion contract that covers construction of seven heavy icebreakers and two large hybrid ferries.

Meanwhile, the Royal Canadian Navy continues with its initiative to acquire a new submarine fleet.

The Canadian government has requested submarine builders submit information on their boats by Nov. 18 in what is seen as a first step in the eventual purchase.

Canadian Defence Minister Bill Blair issued a statement Sept. 16 noting that submarines are crucial to maintaining the country’s sovereignty.  “To avoid any gap in Canadian submarine capabilities, Canada anticipates a contract award by 2028 with the delivery of the first replacement submarine no later than 2035,” Blair noted in his message.

Canadian defence officials have already met with officials from South Korea, Spain, France and Sweden about conventional-powered subs. Norway and Germany have also pitched Canada about a program for such sub

Royal Canadian Navy commander Vice Admiral Angus Topshee visited South Korean submarine builders in November to hear details about that country’s naval programs.

On November 10, Topshee visited Hanwha Ocean's Geoje shipyard and discussed Canada's upcoming submarine acquisition project.

During the visit, Hanwha Ocean introduced Topshee to the KSS-III Batch-II submarine, a model that the firm is highlighting for the Canadian project.

Topshee had an in-depth briefing from Hanwha Ocean on its original design and construction process of the KSS-III Batch-II submarine, according to company officials.

In addition, Hanwha Ocean highlighted that the KSS-III CPS is the only model capable of meeting all High-Level Mandatory Requirements. The company also outlined plans to enable independent submarine maintenance through transfer of technology, allowing In-Service Support (ISS) capabilities to be established in Canada.

Charlie SC Eoh, President and Chief Operating Officer of Hanwha Ocean stated, “The CPSP project is not only about delivering a submarine built in Korea to Canada; it represents a milestone for long-lasting partnership that will promote economic, industrial, and defence cooperation between two nations”.

The president and chief operating officer of Hanwha Ocean also added, “During his visit to the Hanwha Ocean Geoje shipyard, VAdm Topshee had the opportunity to see the current production line of the KSS-III submarine. In addition to obtaining significantly enhanced capability of the submarine much sooner, Hanwha Ocean’s capacity to deliver the KSS-III well in advance of the replacement of Victoria Class Submarines would lead to significant cost-savings for Canada compared to continuing to support this aging fleet.”

Two days later Topshee was at HD Hyundai Heavy Industries along with representatives from Korea’s Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) and ROK Navy Headquarters.

During his visit, Topshee inspected the primary submarine of the ROK Navy, which is under maintenance at HD HHI, and toured its submarine construction and production facilities, gaining firsthand insight into the company’s advanced submarine construction capabilities.

HD HHI officials also introduced their vision for Canada’s submarine acquisition project, actively discussing opportunities for collaboration between the two countries in research, development, and workforce training.

Sang-kyun Lee, CEO of HD HHI, stated, “HD Hyundai Heavy Industries has the capabilities to be a crucial partner not only for Canada’s submarine acquisition project but also for the Navy’s overall operational capacity.”

A HD Hyundai Heavy Industries news release quoted Topshee as stating that he “was deeply impressed by Hyundai Heavy Industries’ technology and productivity, demonstrated not only in submarine construction and maintenance but also in successfully completing various naval projects, including Aegis destroyers, frigates, and patrol ships. In particular, their ability to deliver multiple projects on time, even when managing several simultaneously, was remarkable.”

Back in Canada, Royal Canadian Navy officers continue to develop the requirements for the new subs.

Canada’s proposed new submarines will be required to launch and recover underwater drones and patrol covertly for a minimum of 21 days, defence industry representatives have been told.

The new subs will have to be capable of operating undetected for a range of 7,000 nautical miles, as well as a minimum of 21 days of continuous dived operations.

The boats will need to operate under the ice in the Arctic but only for limited periods of time.

The briefings to industry stipulated that the subs be capable of no less than 60 days of self-sustained operations. On board communication systems must be compatible with the U.S. military.

No details have been released about the budget for the project, but former naval officers who have examined the request for information told the Ottawa Citizen that the cost of the program will be in the $100 billion range.

The documents presented to industry Sept. 16 requested information on the production cost for acquiring eight or 12 submarines.

National Defence spokeswoman Frédérica Dupuis noted the Victoria-class submarines service life comes to an end between 2034 through 2040, and Canada’s intent is to avoid a capability gap in that time period.

But the first submarine won’t actually be operating with the Royal Canadian Navy until 2037, noted various Department of National Defence briefings.

Besides the multi-billion dollar price tag for the submarines there are other potential hurdles for the proposed purchase.

In the past, the navy has had trouble training enough submariners to crew its current fleet of four boats, let alone eight or 12 new boats.

The Conservative party has supported an immediate replacement program for the Victoria-class submarines.

Canada currently operates four used Victoria-class submarines bought second hand from the British. Those were delivered between 2000 and 2004.

Follow David Pugliese on X as well as at:

https://defenceobserver.ca

Shotguns versus Drones – New Methods to Deal With Small UAVs

A US Marine engages a target with a Benelli M1014 semi-automatic shotgun during a training. Shotguns are now being viewed as an effective weapon to deal with small drones. (U.S. Defense Dept. photo)

By David Pugliese

Uninhabited aerial vehicles, more commonly known as drones, continue to dominate the modern battlefield from the Middle East to Ukraine.

They range from larger aircraft to small First Person View (FPV) drones that are being used to drop single bombs onto targets during fighting in Ukraine.

In the Red Sea, Houthi militants are using drones and missiles to target commercial shipping and western navies that have moved into the region to protect merchant vessels. The U.S. Navy is using missiles that can cost as much as $2 million each to destroy a Houthi-launched drone worth several thousand dollars..

During a April 8, 2024 appearance before the Senate defence committee, then Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre noted that Ukraine has faced significant difficulties dealing with continuing drone attacks, with air defence systems being overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of the flying bombs.

Various militaries are scrambling to field counter drone capabilities.

The Department of National Defence has embarked on a variety of tests with the aim to keep troops safe. Everything from jammers to lasers are being examined.

Between May 27 and June 21, the Canadian military held its Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems Sandbox 2024 event. That test, which had observers from the RCMP and U.S. government, focused on how to detect and/or defeat micro and mini uncrewed aerial systems.

Some militaries are going to the tried and true method of destroying such flying threats – intense firepower throwing up a wall of projectiles to shred or damage drones. Rheinmetall noted in January 2024 that the deployment in Ukraine of its Skynex air defence system had already prompted new orders from other militaries.

The system, which can be used to destroy drones and other airborne threats, fires around 1,000 rounds a minute at its targets.

BAE announced in January that it had successfully tested a new counter drone capability on one of the U.S. Army’s armoured vehicles in a live-fire event. The test demonstrated “the turret engaging with ground targets and utilizing a slew-to-cure capability to target both stationary and moving small drones with 30mm proximity rounds,” the statement noted.

As it struggles to acquire missiles from western nations for its air defence needs, Ukraine has resorted to a system of heavy machineguns and anti-aircraft guns to shoot down drones. Such air defence systems are credited with being responsible for more than 40 per cent of the intercepts of drones in Ukraine.

And to deal with the deadly Small First Person View (FPV) drones, militaries are going even lower tech – the 12-guage shotgun.

The Ukrainians were among the first to use shotguns for such purposes.

Ukraine’s armed forces has purchased 4,000 BTS12 shotguns from Hatsan, a Turkish firm, so troops have a FPV drone defence weapon. The shotgun is a bullpup design and has been already credited with a number of kills.

Ukraine’s use of shotguns for counter drone activities, in turn, has sparked a potential market for other militaries. “The use of different types of guns in this capacity in Ukraine has accelerated the demand we get for our shotguns to be sold in a counter-drone configuration – we’ve received a lot of request for information for this from NATO countries,” Mauro Della Costanza, head of sales at Benelli’s defense division, told the American publication, Defense News, at the Eurosatory trade show in June.

“Considering the size of these drones and the high price of some of the more complex countermeasures used to shoot them down – a shotgun with 1,000 [of these] rounds is at maximum three thousand euros,” he added.

French and Italian troops are already equipped with Benellis with the special ALDA (anti-light drone) shotgun round. The round is designed to take down moving targets such as small drones, weighing less than 25 kilograms, at distances between 80 and 120 meters.

Small quadcopters can be destroyed at distances of 90 metres. (In Ukraine troops have been using regular hunting shotgun rounds which only have an effective range against FPVs from 30 to 45 metres).

The French military has been using the Benelli Supernova 12-gauge shotgun since 2022. It has recently started deploying some of the guns with a 28-inch barrel as this offers a longer sight radius to deal with drones.

Belgian troops also use the Benelli M4 shotgun for counter-drone work.

The U.S. Navy has regular drills now for its personnel to use shotguns to deal with drones.

But Ukraine and NATO nations aren’t the only ones to turn to shotguns as a counter-drone method.

Russian troops have also embraced such weaponry after complaints that electronic jammers weren’t doing the job on the Ukraine battlefield.

Drone-users get around the jammers by continually changing frequencies or using jam-resistant control systems for the airborne robots. In addition, the Ukrainians are now producing so many drones that they are overwhelming Russian troops on the ground.

Russia has started issuing its troops 12-gauge Vepr-12 Molot shotguns, according to social media posts in May 2024. Those weapons are a semi-automatic weapon with a five-round magazine and have already been credited by the Russians for shooting down drones.

In addition, Forbes magazine has reported that some Russian military video shows troops with GP-25 under-barrel grenade launchers that have been converted to fire a shotgun cartridge for drone defence.

“I have to say that even a simple shotgun that you go hunting with, which shoots a spray of shot, turns out to be more effective than a machine gun trying to shoot down a drone,” retired Colonel Andrei Koshkin told the Russian newspaper Lenta in April.

Other Russian units have been using an adapter outfitted to the barrels of AK-74 assault rifles, allowing it to fire a grapeshot round that can be used against low-flying drones.

Shotguns are just one weapon in the arsenal to counter drones. They are effective as long as troops realize the limitations of the range such guns have in dealing with drones.

But selection of ammunition for shotguns is equally important.
There is the previously mentioned ALDA (anti-light drone) shotgun.

In 2017 the U.S. Air Force purchased for testing a limited number of SkyNet Mi-5 shells from AMTEC Less Lethal Systems (ALS). The projectile is a 12-gauge anti-drone round designed to be rapidly deployed against commercially available drones. Upon firing through a rifled choke barrel, the round releases five tethered segments and creates a five -foot wide ‘capture net’ to trap the drone’s propellers causing it to fail, according to the manufacturer. The round is said to have a range of up to 140 metres.

In July 2024 the U.S. Marine Corps put out a request for information to defence companies to provide “buckshot-like” canister rounds for its rifles as well as .50 caliber machine guns and 40mm grenade launchers. The Marines are referring to the rounds as “advanced ammunition” for defeating small drones.

Canadian Army To Acquire New Land Vehicle Crew Training System

The Canadian Army’s new Land Vehicle Crew Training System (LVCTS) project will deliver a system, including simulators, to provide better training on various vehicles, including the LAV-6. (Canadian Forces photo)

By David Pugliese

The Canadian Army is in the midst of modernizing its simulation and training systems, with a variety of projects on the go now and others much farther out into the future.

The main project in this area is the Land Vehicle Crew Training System (LVCTS) project. The cost of the initiative is between $250 million and $499 million, according to the Department of National Defence.

The project will acquire a virtual training system that will allow the crews of the main armoured combat vehicles to train as realistically as possible at the five major Canadian Army garrisons. Those garrisons are Gagetown, Valcartier, Petawawa, Edmonton and Shilo. Initial operating capability is expected by the Army in August 2029, with full operating capability in 2032.

The project will deliver the following: a training system consisting of a synthetic environment as well as simulators and learning management system that will enable soldiers to learn, improve and maintain their skills. Also to be delivered is purpose built infrastructure at the five main Canadian Army garrisons as well as a network allowing crew members, crews and groups of crews  to train simultaneously. Long term contractor conducted support is included in the scope of the project.  The systems will cover both individual and collective training from level 1 (crew member) to level 5 (combat team).

Not only will the project provide increased training, but the systems will also help reduce wear/mileage on combat vehicles, cutting back on sustainment efforts needed for those vehicles as well as fuel.

Public Services and Procurement Canada approved five teams of suppliers for the project. They included some of the main players in the country’s industrial base, including CAE, General Dynamics Mission Systems–Canada as well as Raytheon Canada.

Two of the largest defence firms in Canada, Rheinmetall Canada and Lockheed Martin Canada, have had their eye on this project for years, first putting together a strategic partnership in June 2020 to bid on the initiative. That has evolved into the group called FORC3, which represents some of the top companies in Canada. Those include Rheinmetall Canada (Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu), Lockheed Martin Canada (Ottawa), the ADGA Group (Ottawa), Bluedrop Training and Simulation (Halifax), EllisDon Construction and Building Services (London), Paladin AI (Montreal) and REDspace Incorporated (Halifax). The team was recently joined by Calian Ltd of Ottawa.

The FORC3 team noted it is strategically positioned to offer the best training technology and develop Canada’s exportable, industrial, and operational capability. In addition, FORC3 partners currently operate more than 40 global training centres to Canada’s key allies, including NATO and the Five-Eyes Alliance.

“We are very excited and confident that our combined solution and experience represents a compelling value proposition for the Canadian Army” Pietro Mazzei, CEO of Rheinmetall Canada, said in a recent statement.

The Canadian Army is also overseeing other projects. Here is the rundown on those:

--Unit Weapons Training System (UWTS)

Cost: $100 million-249 million

This project will replace the current Small Arms Trainer (SAT) and deliver a networked, dismounted virtual environment to conduct technical and tactical training on all units’ weapons employed across a broad range of units up to the section level.

The project stated in August 2023 and is now in an identification phase. Request for proposals will be issued to industry in 2032. The Army expects initial operational capability for the new systems in 2036.

--Weapons Effects Simulation Modernization (WESM)

Cost: $250 million to 499 million.

 This project will upgrade or replace live simulation equipment currently in use by the Canadian Army. Obsolescence, capability degradation, higher levels of joint and coalition training requirements, and technical advances are the main driving factors for this initiative. Options analysis is underway. A request for proposals to industry is expected in 2030, with initial operating capability set for 2032.

In addition, the Canadian Army is also planning for new Direct Fire Targets. That will cost between $20 million and $49 million. The initiative is to upgrade and replace current suite of remotely operated direct fire targets used to support individual and collective live fire training with static and moving targets that react when hit and employed in prepared, permanent infrastructure or on austere ranges. No dates for the initiative have been yet established.

Target suites are expected to be fielded in Wainwright, Petawawa, Valcartier and Gagetown. Those will include infantry and vehicle targets, static and rail movers for inert ammunition, portable Moving Target System for explosive ordnance, Light and Heavy Hostile Fire Simulators, Night Muzzle Flash Simulators as well as Static Infantry Targets.

Drones Versus Counter-Drone Systems – The New Face Of War

MBDA used the Farnborough International Airshow in July to highlight its Sky Warden counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) modular solution. (MBDA photo)

By David Pugliese

Over the last seven days in late August and early September the drone war was on full display in Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Sept. 2 that Russia had launched 400 attack drones against troops and citizens at various locations in his country.

Russian officials said that Ukraine launched 158 drones overnight, striking at power stations and oil refineries.

Both sides claimed that many, if not most of the aerial vehicles, were shot down.

The conflict in Ukraine has signalled the transformation of modern warfare in a number of ways but none more so than in the realm of robotic weapons.

On a daily basis, Russia and Ukraine use the uninhabited aerial vehicles to try to attack each other’s critical infrastructure. On the battlefield small drones are dropping single bombs on to soldiers.

Last year the Royal United Services Institute estimated that Ukraine is launching 10,000 drones per month. Russia is said to be producing 1,000 drones a day.

During a April 8, 2024 appearance before the Senate defence committee, then Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre noted that Ukraine has faced significant difficulties dealing with continuing drone and other air attacks. “We are seeing Ukrainian air defence systems being overwhelmed by the sheer quantity of drone and missile attacks from Russia,” he said.

In the Red Sea, Houthi militants are using drones and missiles to target commercial shipping and western navies that have moved into the region to protect merchant vessels. On April 10, Houthi forces launched 11 drones at warships, and although all were shot down questions are being raised among senior defence leaders about the mounting costs.

The U.S. Navy is using missiles that can cost as much as $2 million each to destroy a Houthi-launched drone worth several thousand dollars.

In June, US Navy officers described the fighting as the most intense running sea battle the service has faced since the Second World War.

Cmdr. Eric Blomberg with the USS Laboon explained the level of threat and risk during an interview with the Associated Press news service. “I don’t think people really understand just kind of how deadly serious it is what we’re doing and how under threat the ships continue to be,” he said. “We only have to get it wrong once,” he said. “The Houthis just have to get one through.”

Besides the threat in the air, drones at sea are also playing more of a role in ongoing conflicts.

The Houthis have used drone boats but those have been destroyed before they could cause damage – so far.

At times the attacks have used swarms of drones. On July 1, the U.S. military announced it had destroyed three Houthi naval drones in a 24-hour period.

In contrast, Ukraine has had significant success with naval drones. It confirms it has used a combination of missiles and drones to destroy or disable about a third of Russia’s warships in the Black Sea.

The war in Ukraine has seen widespread use of the kamikaze naval drone, prompting militaries to raise concerns about the vulnerability of their warships and the defence industry to start pushing such technology to new limits.

Ukraine has used such systems, along with missiles and aerial drones, to destroy a number of Russian ships, prompting the United Kingdom’s then Defence Minister Grant Shapps to describe Russia’s Black Sea fleet as “functionally inactive.”

It is estimated that Ukraine has destroyed or damaged around 24 Russian ships with its naval drones which are essentially a speed-boat sized platform packed with explosives. Sea drones were also used to damage a key bridge from Russia to Crimea that was used for military resupply.

Technology and equipment to counter drones are well on the way to becoming a growth area for the defence industry and a necessary piece of kit for military forces.

Systems have already being developed and sold and in some cases rush to the frontlines.

Rheinmetall noted in January that the deployment in Ukraine of its Skynex air defence system had already prompted new orders from other militaries.

The system, which can be used to destroy drones and other airborne threats, fires around 1,000 rounds a minute at its targets.

BAE announced in January that it had successfully tested a new counter drone capability on one of the U.S. Army’s armoured vehicles in a live-fire event. The test demonstrated “the turret engaging with ground targets and utilizing a slew-to-cure capability to target both stationary and moving small drones with 30mm proximity rounds,” the statement noted.

As it struggles to acquire missiles from western nations for its air defence needs, Ukraine has resorted to a tried and true system of heavy machineguns and anti-aircraft guns to shoot down drones.

“Mobile air defence in Ukraine is probably responsible for over 40 percent intercepts of these systems [drones],” Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment think tank told the U.S. publication Defense News in April.

Besides fielding sophisticated jammers to deal with aerial drones, Russia has also gone low tech, setting up nets to protect critical facilities.  These large metal nets can entirely enclose a building and are supported by mooring lines anchored to metal stakes in the ground, Forbes magazine reported in April 2024. The idea is that the drones crash into the nets first without harming its intended target.

In Canada, the federal government and military highlighted in the newly released Defence Policy Update (DPU) the threat posed by the unhabituated systems. “Small drones are now being manufactured at high volume and low cost, and are changing warfare from Ukraine to the Red Sea,” the policy document noted. “They are used for reconnaissance and striking targets; in some instances drones that cost just a few hundred dollars have destroyed multi-million dollar platforms. Canada must be prepared to counter these threats as well as deploy robust drone capabilities.”

The DPU also talks about options for acquiring a suite of surveillance and strike drones and counter-drone capabilities. “A counter drone capability will ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces can neutralize drones that threaten our deployed forces, as well as those of our allies and partners,” it added. “Both of these systems will equip Canada to protect its forces against the proliferation of drone technology that is now a feature of modern military operations.”

The Canadian Armed Forces is receiving some counter-drone equipment for troops deployed in Latvia. In that area, the government recently spent $46 million to acquire new counter-drone equipment to be used against Class 1 UAS (small drones).

National Defence also has an eye out for new technology in the counter drone realm.

Between May 27 and June 21, the Canadian military held its Counter Uncrewed Aerial Systems Sandbox 2024 event. That test, which had observers from the RCMP and U.S. government, was trying to figure out how to detect and/or defeat micro and mini uncrewed aerial systems. The tests also examined how the equipment that might be able to accomplish this mission could be integrated into the broader military command and control systems.

Arcfield Canada, in partnership with Fortem Technologies, successfully participated in the 2024 Sandbox exercise. The two companies presented what they called a comprehensive, layered, detect-and-defeat CUAS system during the event. The solution integrated RF, optical, and radar detection, advanced AI-driven Command and Control, and both hard kill and soft kill defeat options. This system can function in fixed, mobile, and portable configurations, offering robust protection against drone threats, Arcfield and Fortem pointed out.

(Arcfield Canada Corp. was earlier this year awarded the CF-18 Avionics In-Service Support program by the Department of National Defence. For more than three decades, the company has served as the prime contractor for the CF-18 Avionics Optimized Weapon System Support program)

MBDA used the Farnborough International Airshow in July to highlight its Sky Warden counter-uncrewed aerial systems (C-UAS) modular solution. That concept uses a ground launched anti-air munition to strike at threats that include Class 1 and smaller Class 2 small uncrewed aircraft systems as well as loitering Munitions. MBDA joined forces with Fortem Technologies to use its DroneHunter technology.

MBDA noted that recent customer demonstrations saw Sky Warden faced with a wide range of offensive drone threats – with varying kinetic characteristics and in realistic operational scenarios – neutralizing them all.

Using artificial intelligence (AI) to assist its human operators to identify and classify the different threats from its full set of sensors (radar, passive RF, electro-optical cameras, etc.), Sky Warden automatically assigned to the most appropriate and available effector maximizing the efficiency of the response, the company stated.

MBDA also pointed out that in the threat scenarios Sky Warden faced, it blocked attacking drones with jammers, captured them with hunter drones, neutralized them in rapid sequence by laser, and destroyed a ‘shahed-like’ drone with a Mistral 3 missile at very long distance.

Sky Warden can be vehicle mounted or in use dismounted.

In 2022, MBDA introduced a naval version of Sky Warden.

Meanwhile, to close the existing capability gaps in mobile defence against drones at short range, Rheinmetall Electronics and MBDA Deutschland recently signed a Letter of Intent.

The companies intend to integrate MBDA's Small Anti Drone Missile into the Skyranger 30 and other Rheinmetall military vehicles.

Utilising “enforcer” technologies, this new guided missile offers an effective solution against small and medium-sized drones providing a high hit probability at long stand-off distances, the companies pointed out.

For its part, the 30mm cannon on the Skyranger 30 offers highly efficient, mobile defence against airborne threats by combining firepower, intelligent sensor technology and high mobility at shorter ranges. This means that the two weapons complement each other perfectly, the firms noted.

The Letter of Intent aims at a long-term cooperation for the integration of the missile into the Skyranger 30 and other military vehicles as well as the development, production and integration of a launcher onto various turret systems and Rheinmetall’s digital system architecture.

Thomas Gottschild, Managing Director of MBDA Germany noted in a statement that current conflicts have clearly shown that drone defence is one of the key challenges militaries now face.

“In order to provide the best possible solution, we are joining forces and building on our partnership with Rheinmetall and their turret solutions to close capability gaps in drone defence with the help of our Small Anti Drone Missile,” he added.

What comes next on the battlefield in terms of drones remains to be seen. But in late August, Ukraine announced it was fielding a new long-range weapon called Palianytsia which Ukrainian officials stated was a combination of a drone and missile.

The Palianytsia took 18 months to develop and build.

Since it was a homegrown development, Ukrainian military officers say they don’t need to seek permission from allies to strike deep into Russia.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy called the Palianytsia, “a new class” of weapon.

Ukrainian officials said they used the weapon to strike at a Russian military installation but did not provide further details. It has been suggested Palianytsia has a range of up to 430 miles.

Ukraine’s technology minister, Mykhailo Fedorov, told The Associated Press news service that his country will now step up production of Palianytsia.

“I think this will be a game changer because we will be able to strike where Russia doesn’t expect it today,” he said.

But specific details are scarce about this new system that is supposed to blur the line between missile and drone.

What does the combination of drone and rocket actually mean?

The Associated Press described the system as having a solid-fuel booster that accelerates it, followed by a jet engine.

Whether the hybrid drone-rocket Palianytsia is a new class of weapon remains to be seen.

The Canadian Army’s New Light Tactical Truck – Is It Right for the Job?

Some soldiers have criticized the Light Tactical Vehicle now being bought by the Canadian Army as being too cramped. (US Department of Defense photo)

By David Pugliese

The Canadian government announced July 23 that will spend $35.8 million for 90 Light Tactical Vehicles (LTV) which will be used by the Canadian Army in Latvia. This new fleet of vehicles will enable troops to operate more effectively in complex terrain and isolated locations that larger vehicles cannot access, according to the Canadian Army. The vehicles will also be used to transport combat equipment, which will reduce the loads carried by individual soldiers.

The contract with GM Defense Canada Company of Oshawa, Ontario will see the delivery of 36 cargo and 54 personnel variants of the vehicle. The personnel variant is designed for teams of up to nine soldiers, while the cargo variant is designed for two to four soldiers and larger cargo. Light forces equipped with a combination of cargo and personnel variants will be able to carry weapons, personal effects, and combat supplies for 72 hours of self-sufficient operation, according to the Canadian Army and National Defence.

All the vehicles are expected to arrive in Latvia by October.

The contract also includes integrated logistics support and up to two years of spare parts for the LTV fleet, as well as an option to procure up to an additional 18 LTVs.

The LTV contract is the first phase of the Light Forces Enhancement (LFE) project. The LFE Project Phase 2 will see up to 222 Tactical Mobility Platforms – also in cargo and personnel variants – and up to 23 light trailers, delivered to Canadian Army regular and reserve forces.

Canadian Forces spokeswoman LCdr Linda Coleman told Esprit de Corps that the  LTV is based on the Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 mid-size truck. Coleman said while the contact is with GM Defense Canada the vehicles are actually being made by GM Defense LLC and are coming from Concord, North Carolina.

The life expectancy for the new fleet is estimated at 15 years.

National Defence spokeswoman Frederica Dupuis said the Light Tactical Vehicles were procured through an open and competitive procurement process, which included industry engagement activities in the form of two Requests for Information and a Request for Proposals in the spring of 2024. But only one bid was received, she noted.

GM Defense Canada said its LTVs feature a high percentage of commercial-off-the-shelf parts, including Chevrolet Performance components for enhanced off-road capability. Weighing less than 5000 pounds / 2232 kilograms, the LTVs offer air transportability, in addition to ease of maintenance and sustainment with parts that may be accessed through GM's global supply chain, according to the firm.

But no sooner had the purchase announcement been made than there was criticism of the LTVs in Canadian military online forums. There were questions about the hefty price tag for such a simple vehicle, with soldiers pointing out that a commercial pickup truck would be just as effective for the limited role the LTVs could perform.

There were also references to the Pentagon’s director of operational test and evaluation which had published their findings of this GM vehicle, first in 2020 and then in 2022.  That office warned that the vehicle is not designed to defeat or counter specific threats, nor is not operationally effective for combat missions against near-peer threats.

The U.S. evaluators also noted deficiencies such as engine cracks and steering loss.  In addition, the test report also pointed out that the vehicle lacked ballistic armour, that it was too cramped and that soldiers’ individual weapons weren’t easily available in the event of an attack. There were also difficulties in operating a mounted machine gun from the vehicle while it was on the move. (Despite the concerns, the U.S. Army decided to proceed with buying the vehicles, noting that improvements had been made since the initial testing).

Both National Defence and the Canadian Army wouldn’t refute the specific issues raised by the U.S. evaluators. Instead National Defence spokesperson Dupuis said that the vehicle had a proven record with NATO and that an off-the-shelf design was needed by Canada to ensure quick delivery to soldiers. “As with current and future vehicle fleets, DND works very closely with manufacturers so that vehicles not only meet requirements, but also operate as intended and are safe for our members to use,” Dupuis added in an email.

GM Defense spokeswoman Sonia Taylor was more forthcoming. She issued the following statement: “Issues raised in the 2022 DOT&E report regarding our Infantry Squad Vehicle surfaced in the required Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) testing in 2021 and were specific to the harsh and extreme testing environment in Yuma, Arizona. All issues identified at Yuma were addressed in coordination with our U.S. Army customer in 2022, and a new vehicle was provided to re-run the RAM testing that started in July 2022 and concluded the following January. There were no mission failures or system aborts from the last round of testing, and GM Defense received a full-rate production decision from the Army, validating our manufacturing and engineering processes to support the ISV, in spring of 2023.” 

A number of Canadian soldiers pointed out on social media that Latvia, where the vehicles are to be used, sometimes gets frigid temperatures and snow, but they noted the LTVs had no protection from the elements.

Questions about this issue - about protecting the troops from the cold and elements and whether there was an enclosure for the vehicles to protect soldiers – were asked. But neither National Defence nor the Canadian Army would answer those questions. There was no explanation why the questions weren’t answered but it seems safe to conclude that there will be no protection for military personnel from the cold and elements.

So what comes next?

During an April 2, 2024 presentation to defence company executives, Canadian Army Lt. Col. Allan Thomas noted that full operating capability for the LTVs will be reached in 2025.

The Canadian Army/National Defence stated in its responses to news outlets that the timelines for the second vehicle to be purchased will be “confirmed as work progresses.”

That isn’t entirely true. Thomas in his presentation to industry in April already outlined the plan. He said the Phase 2 implementation would start in 2026. Initial operating capability is expected in 2028 with full operating capability in 2029

It is unclear why the Canadian Army and National Defence provided inaccurate information to the news media.

RIMPAC 2024 – Asterix Shines While HMCS Max Bernays Struggles

MV Asterix shined during RIMPAC 2024, leading a record number of Replenishments at Sea (US Department of Defense photo)

By David Pugliese

Rim of the Pacific 2024 has now wrapped up with the Canadian Forces declaring a success and pointing out how the exercise is an example of the country’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region.

Rim of the Pacific is the largest international maritime exercise in the world and is held bi-annually. RIMPAC 2024 this year consisted of 29 participating nations, 40 surface ships, three submarines, 14 national land forces, over 150 aircraft and more than 25,000 personnel. Exercises were conducted in and around the Hawaiian islands throughout the month of July.

HMCS Vancouver was accompanied by HMCS Max Bernays, Motor Vessel Asterix and a shore-based contingent of close to 300 Canadian Armed Forces members for RIMPAC 2024, according to the Department of National Defence.

After its successful participation in RIMPAC 2024, HMCS Vancouver continued on to its various other duties. In August it began its mission for Operation Horizon; on August 8, the Canadian frigate joined New Zealand’s HMNZS Aotearoa and later Singapore’s RSS Stalwart.

On Operation Horizon, Canada’s forward-presence mission in the Indo-Pacific region, HMCS Vancouver will join HMCS Montréal. In addition to its participation on Operation Horizon, HMCS Vancouver will contribute to Operation Neon, which serves to monitor the implementation of United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea in collaboration with allies and partners, National Defence spokesman Kened Sadiku told Esprit de Corps.

HMCS Vancouver will continue its deployment through December of this year, he added.

MV Asterix also had a highly successful RIMPAC 2024. Singapore, Germany and Italy). The 26,000-tonne Asterix, a commercial vessel converted for naval resupply purposes by Davie Shipbuilding in Quebec and leased to the Canadian government by the firm’s affiliate Federal Fleet Services, has become critical for the Royal Canadian Navy’s fleet. Just months after being delivered in early 2018 to the military it was at sea supporting RCN and allied operations.  The RCN has come to rely so much on Asterix – now its only supply vessel – that the service increased the days the ship was required almost immediately. The lease for the Asterix has also been extended until 2025.

During RIMPAC 2024, MV Asterix conducted 34 Replenishments at Sea (RAS), which was recorded as the highest compared to other partner nations, Sadiku pointed out. Those replenishments were with 16 different vessels from nine nations (Canada, US, Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea).

The ship completed many firsts such as: First RAS between Asterix and South Korea; First RAS between Asterix and Italy; First RAS between Asterix and a San Antonio-class landing platform, dock (LPD) vessel; First RAS between Asterix and another auxiliary oiler replenishment (AOR) vessel (HMNZS Aotearoa heavy jackstay crew certification); Largest ever ammo transfer conducted by Asterix (operational stock to HMCS Vancouver); and seven RAS in 48 hours (28-29 July), highest RAS operational tempo for Asterix to date.

U.S. Navy SEALS and Republic of Korea special forces also conducted drills on Asterix.

Following its deployment on Exercise RIMPAC, MV Asterix departed Hawaii on August 4. The ship will transit the Panama Canal and conduct a brief stop in Norfolk, VA and is expected to arrive back in Halifax on September 3. 

HMCS Max Bernays, one of the new Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, had a less than successful RIMPAC 2024 and certainly not one the RCN wanted to publicize.

The AOPS had to return to Pearl Harbor on July 12 due to mechanical issues and seawater flooding into one of the areas of the vessel. It took the crew about 30 minutes to stop the flooding, but before that could happen around 20,000 litres of seawater entered the ship. Technicians discovered that there were problems with a pumping and cooling system so they recommended HMCS Max Bernays return to Pearl Harbor.

Sailors tipped off the Ottawa Citizen newspaper about the problems as they continue to challenge the RCN’s leadership claims that ongoing problems with the AOPS are simply part of teething problems on a new fleet.

The incident is the latest of a number of issues plaguing the new ships, which are costing almost $5 billion.

In March, there were reports of other flooding problems. In addition, there have been mechanical failures involving anchors, a refuelling system that’s too heavy to use, as well as structural issues hindering the operation of Cyclone helicopters from the vessels.

The Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships also can’t perform emergency towing, as was required in the original contract, and some cranes on the vessels are inoperable, National Defence officials confirmed.  Other problems, such as contaminated fuel and issues with systems to launch lifeboats, are also being examined or fixed.

In addition, media outlets reported in 2022 that the first AOPS, HMCS Harry DeWolf, had been taken out of service for several months because of ongoing mechanical problems, including issues with diesel generators. Concerns have also been raised about the safety of drinking water on the vessels.

In addition, HMCS Max Bernays was accepted from Irving even though a system that allows the vessel to manoeuvre wasn’t functioning properly. There were also problems with the fire suppression system on HMCS Harry DeWolf.

The ships only have a one-year warranty, Canadian military personnel have also pointed out, which means the taxpayer is footing the bill for most of the repairs.

HMCS Max Bernays was delivered in 2022 to the navy by Irving Shipbuilding.

National Defence spokesman Sadiku stated that following the initial issue with the ship’s water-cooling system and subsequent repairs, HMCS Max Bernays rejoined Exercise RIMPAC on July 25. It returned to Pearl Harbor on July 31 for a change of command, and then departed Pearl Harbor again on August 4.

The ship is currently transiting to its home port in Esquimalt, while conducting training at sea with United States Navy partners, he added. As of press time it was expected to arrive in Esquimalt on August 23 after which the ship will conduct local patrols, to assure Canadian sovereignty, while training and generating sailors.

“Overall, HMCS Max Bernays achieved various objectives during the exercise, including participation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise activities, embarking a foreign helicopter and conducting certifications, and integrating into the Combined Maritime Force as part of Canada’s contribution to RIMPAC,” according to Sadiku.

Are the issues with HMCS Max Bernays  now dealt with?

“The original cause of the issue in the water-cooling system was found to be a broken gauge line, and defective valves. Initial repairs to the system involved installing a cofferdam (an isolating space) to keep the water from coming in, while troubleshooting was conducted,” Sadiku explained. “The gauge line and four valves were replaced, followed by removal of the cofferdam,  and testing the system. The complete water-cooling system has been inspected and, while other valves will require replacement, there is sufficient redundancy in the system. We are confident that it will hold until its full repair in Esquimalt this fall and that the system is operational, and the ship is safe to sail.”

Introducing The River-Class Destroyer, The RCN’s New Warship

By David Pugliese

Work is starting on the country’s newest warship fleet – the Canadian Surface Combatant – with the building of a test module to further refine construction techniques.

The announcement in late June focused largely on federal government messaging about the naming of the class- going forward the CSC will be known as the River-class.

The CSC is based on BAE Systems’ Type 26 warship design also being built by the United Kingdom and Australia.

The official NATO Ship Designator for the River-class warship will be DDGH – a destroyer (DD), guided (G) missile, helicopter (H) capable, according to National Defence. As the Royal Canadian Navy’s next generation combat ship, the CSC replaces both the Iroquois-class destroyers and the Halifax-class frigates.

The official announcement by Defence Minister Bill Blair and Royal Canadian Navy commander Vice Admiral Angus Topshee focused on the positive, pointing out numbers of jobs linked to the CSC project and the importance of the new class of ships. Blair and Topshee also announced the names of the first three ships. Those are -His Majesty’s Canadian Ships Fraser, Saint-Laurent, and Mackenzie.

But a technical briefing the day before by senior government officials, as well as documents obtained by Esprit de Corps, outline more specific details while at the same time raising questions about the CSC project. (Under the rules imposed by the Department of National Defence, reporters can only identify the individuals doing the briefing as “senior government officials” although they are actually the key players at Public Services and Procurement Canada, DND/RCN for the CSC program).

Among the points raised:

--Because of the aging Halifax-class frigates and increasing maintenance costs for those vessels, the senior government officials said getting quick delivery of the new CSC is of “vital importance.”

But at the same time they also revealed the rather slow production schedule at Irving Shipbuilding for the River-class line. Nine ships will be delivered by 2040. The last ship, the 15th, won’t be delivered until 2050.

--Officially, delivery of the first River-class destroyer, HMCS Fraser, is expected in the “early 2030s,” according to the government. But National Defence documents obtained by Esprit de Corps noted that the first CSC will be delivered in 2033 with the RCN hoping for initial operating capability in 2034. No explanation has been provided on why DND and PSPC officials haven’t been more forthcoming with journalists on the actual delivery date.

--Because of the lengthy delivery schedule, the Halifax-class frigates will stay in operation longer than anticipated. That will require more upgrades to be done to the Halifax-class but no details on when that will happen or how that will cost were provided by the officials.

--Even though construction of CSC is beginning, government officials acknowledged they don’t have a final cost for the project. They also still don’t have a final design. Ship designed started in February 2019 and The preliminary design review was completed in December 2022. But work continues. An implementation contract is to be signed in late 2024 or early 2025, allowing for full rate production on the first CSC ship next year.

--Government officials pushed the message, repeatedly, that there have been no changes to operational requirements for the CSC. While that is true, there have been design changes or as the government officials like to state, “equipment modifications.” That, in particular, has meant changes in weapons and the Combat Management System.

--There has been a reduction in weapons on the CSC. When the RCN originally highlighted the CSC in its “Right ship for Canada” public relations campaign, the service noted that there would be 32 Missile Vertical Launch Systems on each combatant. Now, that has been reduced to 24. No explanation was provided.

-The main gun system is the Leonardo 127-mm Vulcano. In 2021, Leonardo announced it had been awarded a contract to supply to Lockheed Martin four OTO 127/64 LW Vulcano naval guns for the CSC.

In 2019 news outlets reported on an industry-produced document from Raytheon that had been submitted to DND. CBC reported that the briefing raised concerns about the RCN’s choice of a main gun for the CSC — a 127 millimetre MK 45 described in the document as 30-year-old technology that will soon be obsolete and cannot fire precision-guided shells.

National Defence immediately countered that the briefing was from industry who had been passed over for the main contract. "It is not uncommon for companies to present unsolicited material to our department when they are unsuccessful in a competitive process," department spokesman Andrew McKelvey said at the time.

Then RCN commander Vice-Admiral Art McDonald pointed out that DND was already aware of the Vulcano and stood by its decision to select the MK 45. "We did our homework,” he explained. “We talked to other navies. We engaged our allies."

Less than two years later the MK45 was out and the Vulcano was in.

--The CSC was supposed to be equipped CMS (Combat Management System) 330. CMS 330 was developed in Canada, for the Royal Canadian Navy and, according to Lockheed Martin Canada” is now a globally sought after product. It has created and sustained economic opportunities in communities across the country, where a number of jobs are supported in Ottawa, Montreal, Halifax and Victoria through the software and hardware design, engineering, production, and testing of the advanced technology.”

CMS 330 was developed as a result of 30 plus years’ experience and knowledge of Canadian and NATO naval operations, the firm added. In 2008, Lockheed Martin Canada was selected to design this system as part of the Halifax-Class Modernization project. “CMS 330 is not only proving itself on Canada’s HALIFAX Class Frigates, but it is also the backbone of the technical solution for the Royal New Zealand Navy’s ANZAC Frigate System Upgrade, as well as the command and surveillance management system for Canada’s new Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS),” according to Lockheed Martin Canada.

CMS-330 is also considered an affordable and flexible solution with low life-cycle costs. It is an open-architecture based system which adapts to a variety of subsystems, reducing risk and ensuring delivery of unique customer requirements. A ITAR-free CMS design allows the international customer to manage and exploit its full range of capabilities and advantages without restriction, Lockheed Martin noted.

But CMS 330 has been dropped in favour of the U.S. Aegis Combat System with the 3D AESA SPY-7 radar. No official explanation has been provided for dropping the unique Canadian-built CMS. 

But using Aegis will allow the RCN to integrate better into the U.S. Navy system, although it will make Canada beholding to U.S. control over any upgrades and modernization. That is good news for U.S. companies but maybe not so great for Canadian taxpayers.

--Originally the CSC program had the Sea Ceptor for Close-In Air Defence. Sea Ceptor, from the European consortium MBDA, is the next-generation, ship-based, all-weather, air defence weapon system. It was recently used in combat in the Red Sea to deal with drones. The weapon system is now in full-scale development for the UK MOD as the principal air defence capability for the Royal Navy’s Type 23 and Type 26 frigates.

But for the CSC, Sea Ceptor is out and an American-made missile system is in. No explanation was provided as to why Canada has now selected the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM) built by Raytheon. But there are reports that the RIM-116 will be cheaper as it is used by the USN and other navies.

--The crew size will be reduced. Halifax class frigates have a 250 person crew, the CSC will have 210.

--As outlined previously, the weight of the ship has increased by 800 tonnes. Displacement is now 8080 tonnes. There will be increased costs in infrastructure and operations because of the increased weight but government officials acknowledged they don’t have specifics yet. In contrast a Halifax-class frigate is 4,830 tonnes. 

-A Land Based Test Facility for the CSC is supposed to be up and running in 2027 and fully operational in 2029. 

OTHER FACTORS

COST

The project has already faced significant increases in cost from the original estimated price tag of $26 billion. Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux now estimates the cost of the ships to be around $84 billion.

A Conservative government started the surface combatant project to replace the current fleet of Halifax-class frigates, but in 2015 the Conservatives acknowledged the cost was increasing and the program might have to be scaled back.

The Liberal government elected that year, however, reaffirmed the commitment to the CSC project and acquiring all 15 ships.

National Defence remains steadfast it will not alter course and that the project is a success so far.

National Defence had maintained the cost will be between $56 billion and $60 billion. The government will have more insight on the actual cost when it signs a contract with the builders later this year or in early 2025.

But a former procurement chief for National Defence said moving forward on such an expensive program without having a final design for the ship or actual cost is folly. “That’s a recipe for disaster,” said Alan Williams, former assistant deputy minister of materiel at National Defence. “After all these years they still don’t know how much this will cost or the actual design of the ship.”

Conservative MP Kelly McCauley said he and other MPs believed the construction of the CSC alone would eventually cost more than $100 billion.

In a cost update released in October 2022, PBO Giroux also outlined the life-cycle cost for the ships, putting that at $306 billion. That last figure is a significant leap; in 2013, the auditor general’s office noted that figure would be $64 billion over 30 years. “Every time we look at this (project), the costs go up,” Giroux noted.

SCHEDULE

The first completed CSC was originally to have been delivered in the early 2020s. But in February 2021, National Defence admitted the delivery of the first vessel wouldn’t take place until 2030 or 2031. Now that won’t take place until 2033 and it is possible more delays could follow.

AOPS TEST RUN

In an April 8, 2024 appearance before the Senate defence committee, National Defence procurement chief Troy Crosby pointed to ongoing problems with the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships being built for the Royal Canadian Navy. He testified that National Defence’s handlings of those problems “gives me great confidence in our ability to take on the much more complex delivery of the Canadian Surface Combatant in the coming years.”

At the June 28, 2024 CSC news conference Shannon Sampson, President of Marine Workers Federation Local 1 which represents the shipbuilders of Irving’s Halifax Shipyard, noted the efforts on AOPS. “We are now achieving the highest standard of quality,” she added. “It’s an opportunity to show the world what Canadian shipbuilding is capable of,” she said of CSC.

But critics have questioned Sampson’s claim of high standards, noting that AOPS is facing a number of significant technical and mechanical flaws that go beyond what would normally be acceptable in a new class of ship. The Royal Canadian Navy is trying to fix a series of problems on its Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships including anchors that aren’t effective, a refueling system that’s too heavy to use, and areas on the vessels that are leaking. In addition, the AOPS can’t perform emergency towing as was required in the original contract and some cranes on the vessels are inoperable, National Defence confirmed.

EXTRA MONEY FOR IRVING

In summer 2023 the federal government announced it was providing an extra $463 million to Irving Shipbuilding is to allow the firm to modernize its Halifax-area facilities so the company can build the Canadian Surface Combatants. That money, however, marks a significant reversal in the government’s official National Shipbuilding Strategy.

Irving’s shipyard was selected in 2011 as the winner of a multi-billion dollar program to construct the country’s new fleets of warships. Among the requirements for winning the bid was that the yard had the capability to build the vessels and taxpayers wouldn’t need to contribute funding to outfit facilities for the task. If a yard didn’t have the ability to build the CSC, it wouldn’t get the contract.

But, according to the government news release from last year, the new influx of money to Irving “will enhance the efficiency of ship construction while improving project costs and delivering best value for Canadians.”

Last summer in defending the decision by the Liberal government to give one of the richest families in Canada the extra $463 million, Sampson wrote that, “We don’t have the luxury of more time when it comes to building the CSC and I believe the path we’re on today is the fastest way to replace them.”

That claim, however, sparked a backlash on social media with people pointing out the ballooning CSC costs and the 25-year build schedule. They noted that shipyards in other nations are building similar warships at significantly less cost and more quickly.

Farewell to the Chief – Gen. Wayne Eyre Retires After A Controversial Tenure

By David Pugliese

General Wayne Eyre is leaving the building.

Eyre says he will retire sometime in the summer but a specific date has yet to be made public.

Eyre has been Chief of the Defence Staff since 2021 and in command of the Canadian Armed Forces during one of its most tumultuous times, which has included widespread allegations of sexual assault and misconduct among the senior ranks.

He was named acting defence chief in February 2021 after it was revealed that military police were looking into misconduct allegations against then CDS Adm. Art McDonald. The Liberal government named Eyre as the full-time chief on Nov. 25 of that year, even though no charges were ever laid against McDonald.

Eyre’s departure was announced Jan. 12 by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s office. Trudeau noted that as chief of the defence staff, Eyre helped stabilize the Canadian Forces “during a period of turmoil and led the institution in responding to the many security crises and challenges facing our country and the world.”

Trudeau thanked Eyre for his many years of service to Canadians and congratulated him on his upcoming retirement. Eyre has served in the Canadian Forces for 40 years.

Eyre declined to be interviewed for this article. He also declined to respond to written questions about his time as CDS. Those included his views on what he thought his top achievements were as CDS and what he believed was his legacy.

But Eyre has had a controversial tenure, prompting some serving and retired military personnel to label him a ‘yes man’ for Trudeau on everything from sexual misconduct to changing dress and deportment regulations. The general’s defenders point out that while he had to keep the Liberal government happy with changes to the CAF, he was able to push forward an agenda that has seen the procurement of major pieces of equipment for the Army, Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force.

Not all of his efforts have worked. Eyre has talked about the need for culture change to stem the number of sexual assaults, but during his tenure the number of reported incidents of sexual misconduct and assaults actually increased.

While it is difficult to determine what Eyre’s legacy will be, here are some of the flashpoints from his time as CDS:

CHANGES TO DRESS AND DEPORTMENT REGULATIONS

One of the most divisive decisions made under Eyre’s leadership was the changes to dress and deportment regulations. Dress Instructions were deemed to lack inclusivity and were seen as discriminatory and not reflecting modern society, according to the Canadian Armed Forces. So changes came into effect in September 2022 and sparked an immediate backlash from serving and retired personnel.

Eyre faced criticism for bringing in what some describe as the Liberal government’s “woke” agenda. Some of the controversial elements of that are the move to a gender-neutral dress code and the decision to allow military personnel to have coloured or long hair, face tattoos or long nails if so desired.

The criticism got so bad that Eyre’s office had to shut down in January 2024 the comments section on his social media account on X (formerly Twitter).

“In recent months, we observed a concerning increase in malicious and misinformative engagements that proved detrimental to the Canadian Armed Forces’ ethics, values, and communication objectives,” National Defence spokesperson Andrée-Anne Poulin noted in an email. “Considering this, we made the decision back in January to close the comments section on the CDS (Chief of the Defence Staff) X account.”

CAF MEMBERS LEAVING

In the fall of 2021, Eyre angered Canadian Forces personnel when he blamed the military’s sexual misconduct crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic for an exodus of personnel. “We need our mid-level leaders to dig deep and do this for the institution, to put service before self, not to retreat into retirement, but to advance forward and face the challenges head-on,” Eyre stated then.

The general’s comments generated an immediate and largely negative response on social media. Military personnel said that Eyre was out of touch and that the exodus of personnel had started long before the pandemic or the sexual misconduct crisis. Poor leadership and concerns about quality of life were among common issues cited by those who had left.

Others criticized Eyre for admonishing soldiers who had committed a large part of their lives to serving in the military, noting they had the right to decide when they should leave.

Eyre later acknowledged that his comments created anger among military personnel and tried, unsuccessfully in the eyes of some, to walk back his comments.

TOXIC OR POOR LEADERSHIP

Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer Bob McCann warned during a video townhall April 23, 2024 that Canadian Forces personnel were leaving because of “toxic” military leadership. Strangely, Eyre who was sitting beside McCann at the time said nothing. Instead he talked about personnel leaving because they are being moved too often to new locations around the country.

Interestingly, Eyre had previously talked about the need to limit moves of military personnel but he has also not delivered on changes in that area. Eyre has talked about the need for more military housing but has faced criticism for failing to deliver on that issue.

LAWSUITS BY FELLOW GENERALS

Eyre is in the unusual position of being the only CDS to have faced two lawsuits from his fellow generals.

The legal documents and allegations made in the legal actions have pulled back the curtain on a military and political leadership that seems rife with infighting.

In 2023 Maj. Gen. Dany Fortin filed a lawsuit naming Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Eyre and other senior government and military officials for their alleged roles in Fortin’s removal from command and a military police investigation into allegations of sexual assault.

Fortin was ultimately acquitted of the charge.

In his lawsuit Fortin alleged that at the behest of Eyre as well as “political actors,” the investigation against him was “rushed, flawed and did not follow the usual or ordinary course of a CFNIS investigation.” He also later alleged that the senior leadership, led by Eyre, was breaking the law by withholding material needed for his legal defence. In addition, Fortin’s lawyers obtained documents which showed at one point Eyre considered whether he would need to resign from the role of CDS.

Eyre has declined to comment on the lawsuit and Fortin settled it out of court last year, reportedly receiving a significant financial payment.

In late May 2024, Eyre was also named in a new lawsuit filed by lawyers for Lt.-Gen. Steven Whelan.

Military prosecutors withdrew service offence charges against Whelan last year which claimed that he had an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate. Now Whelan’s lawyers are accusing Eyre and others of destroying the officer’s career to score political points, the CBC reported in its coverage of the lawsuit. Whelan is asking for $10 million in damages.

Eyre did not provide comment about this lawsuit.

But the statement of claim filed by Whelan’s lawyer contains a number of allegations against senior bureaucrats and points a picture of a toxic environment in which the military and civilian leaders operated.

SALUTING A MEMBER OF THE WAFFEN SS

Eyre will go down in history as the only Chief of the Defence Staff who has honoured and saluted a member of the Waffen SS. In September 2023, Eyre faced criticism from veterans when he twice joined all MPs in a standing ovation in the House of Commons for Waffen SS soldier Yaroslav Hunka.

Some veterans demanded an apology from the top soldier for his actions, but he refused. He declined an invitation from Esprit de Corps to explain why he saluted Hunka and why he won’t apologize.

WW2 TURNING POINT REMEMBERED: The 80th Anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad

By Newell Durnbrooke

On February 2nd, 1943 the battered remnants of the German 6th Army surrendered to the victorious Soviet forces in the smouldering rubble of what had once been the city of Stalingrad. For five months the German Wehrmacht and their Axis allies had first battled their way into Stalingrad, and then defended their gains after being cut off and surrounded by superior Soviet forces.

The entire world had watched this colossal struggle, as Hitler’s heretofore undefeated legions engaged in furious house-to-house street battles with an equally stubborn Soviet foe. The ferocity of the Soviet defence was best exemplified by the defenders of the legendary Pavlov’s House. Led by Sergeant Yakov Pavlov, less than 30 Soviet soldiers stood their ground against the overwhelming Nazi onslaught. It is worth noting that this tiny brave force of Soviets held out for longer against the Germans than France or Belgium had been able to resist the Blitzkrieg. In the end, the capitulation of the starving survivors of the German Army in Stalingrad sent a strong message to the Allied forces: The vaunted German war machine could be beaten. To this day, Stalingrad remains the bloodiest battle in the history of warfare, with an estimated 2 million lives lost from both sides. Perhaps more importantly it is also widely recognized as the major turning point in WW2.

Following the German defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler and his Axis allies could still mount limited offensives against the Soviets. However they would never again enjoy the battlefield superiority that had allowed them to conquer Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Volga River. There remained two more years of fierce fighting, but following their decisive defeat at Stalingrad, it was the beginning of the end of Hitler’s Third Reich. While the Soviets sacrificed themselves heroically in the close quarter struggles of Stalingrad, they did not do so entirely alone. Since Hitler had launched Operation Barbarossa – the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Allies such as Britain and Canada had begun shipping war materiel to the Soviet Union to keep them in the fight against the common Nazi foe. 

Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, forced the western allies to work together with the Soviets. Shortly after the Soviet Union entered the war, Canada restored diplomatic relations with Moscow for the first time since the Russian Bolshevik revolution in 1917. Although he would not established an actual embassy in Ottawa until 1944, in the summer of 1941 Georgy Zarubin was named the Soviet Union’s first Ambassador to Canada. One of the first acts of Canadian-Soviet military cooperation came in August and September of 1941 in a little known action known as Operation Gauntlet. A Canadian-led expeditionary force successfully evacuated about 2,000 Soviet miners from the Norwegian Island of Spitsbergen and returned them to the Soviet port of Archanglesk.

The first few months of the war were disastrous for the Soviets. In the opening battles the Axis forces encircled and destroyed entire Soviet armies. The Soviet loses in men and material were enormous. However with the onset of winter and the transfer of fresh troops from Siberia, the Soviets were able to halt the Germans at the gates of Moscow in December 1941. This was the first tactical setback for Hitler’s ground forces since they had invaded Poland in 1939 and then swept through Scandinavia and Western Europe in the spring of 1940. With the Spring thaw in 1942, the regrouped and re-equipped Axis armies were ready to resume their advance deeper into the Soviet Union. The main German thrust in the summer of 1942 would not be aimed at the symbolic capital Moscow but rather at the oil-rich Caucasus in the southern Soviet Union. As such, the city of Stalingrad became strategically important to both sides. It was a major industrial and transport hub on the Volga river. Whoever controlled Stalingrad would have access to the oil fields of the Caucasus and control over shipping on the Volga. Once it became clear that this was the objective of Hitler’s renewed offensive, Soviet leader Joset Stalin pleaded with the western allies to open a second front in France to draw off Axis reinforcements.  The result was the ill-fated Operation Jubilee, also known as the Dieppe Raid. Launched on 19 August, this amphibious assault-landing of over 6,000 infantry was a predominantly Canadian effort.

Supported by the RAF and the Royal Navy, the port of Dieppe was to be captured and held by the Canadians for a brief period, before the attacking force was to make a calculated withdrawal.  In addition to destroying German coastal defence and port installations, the Dieppe raid was intended to raise morale of the allies and demonstrate to Stalin their commitment to re-open the Western front. As the actual Dieppe raid unfolded, it became evident that the aerial and naval support was insufficient to enable the Canadian ground forces to achieve their objectives. Their tanks became trapped on the beaches and the Canadian infantry were pinned down heavy German fire. Within ten hours the fiasco had fully unfolded. Forced to retreat under fire, 3,623 of the 6,086 Allied soldiers who landed on the beach had been killed, wounded or captured by the Germans.

There was little to show for the horrific casualties, yet censored western media reported the raid to have been a ‘success.’ Military brass knew better, and the Soviets realized there would be no ‘Second Front’ opened anytime soon. Just four days after the disastrous Dieppe Raid, on 23 August 1942, the first Axis tanks advanced into the outskirts of Stalingrad. The Soviet defenders were on their own. However,one way in which Canada could continue to aid their Soviet allies in their valiant defence was the provision of vital war materiel. Through the winter of 1942-43, the Royal Canadian Navy was heavily engaged in escorting supply convoys through the Arctic Sea to the Soviet port cities of Murmansk and Archanglesk. A second vital Allied supply link to the Soviet Union had also been established over land through Iran to a receiving center in Baku, Azerbaijan in the Caucasus.

One of the most effective pieces of kit shipped by Canada to the Soviet Union during those critical months, was the 16 ton Valentine infantry tank. Built by the Canadian Pacific Rail Company in Montreal, these light tanks were well armoured and packed a 2 pounder cannon. In total Canada shipped 1,420 Valentines to the Soviet union during the course of the war – more than any other foreign tank in service with the Soviet Army. By the time the Germans had reached Stalingrad on the Volga, some 450 Valentine tanks from Canada has been safely delivered to the Soviets. 

Shortly after reaching the Volga River and investing the city of Stalingrad, the Germans launched an offensive using their 6th Army and a corps of the 5th Army. The attack was supported by an intense Luftwaffe bombing that reduced the entire city to rubble. In the early stages of the fighting, the Soviets would use suicidal human wave attacks to repel the Germans. The battle degenerated into house-to-house fighting as both sides poured in seemingly endless reinforcements. By November, the Germans had captured all but a couple of narrow Soviet bridgeheads on the west bank of the Volga. Hitler pre-maturely announced to the German people news that Stalingrad had been captured. On November 19, with the Germans sensing that victory was within their grasp, the Soviets launched their own surprise counter offensive dubbed Operation Uranus. This two pronged attack across the Volga River targeted the two Romanian armies which were protecting the German 6thArmy’s flanks.  The Romanians were quickly overrun, resulting in the besieging German 6th Army becoming themselves encircled in Stalingrad. Hitler was furious at this development and he ordered the 6th Army to “hold at all costs”. No breakout was to be attempted by the surrounded Axis forces. Luftwaffe Commander Field Marshal Hermann Goring boasted that his fleet of Ju52 transport aircraft could keep the Axis pocket supplied. However, Goring’s ambitions could not be fulfilled. The Sixth army was steadily reduced through the deadly attrition of close quarter combat. Even after an outside German rescue attempt had been repulsed and the resupply by air had proven to be woefully inadequate, the Axis troops in the rubble of Stalingrad fought on for two more months.

On February 2, 1943, having exhausted their food, fuel and ammunition the survivors of the 6th Army finally capitulated. This was the first surrender of an entire German Field Army in World War II. By the end of Operation Uranus, Soviet forces captured about 200,000 soldiers, officers, and generals. These prisoners included Friedrich von Paulus who just three days prior to the capitulation had been promoted to the rank of Field Marshal by Hitler. The promotion came with a reminder to Paulus that“not a single [German] Field Marshal had ever been taken prisoner”. Nevertheless, Field Marshal von Pasulus did surrender and that act was the harbinger of the impending doom for Hitler’s Third Reich. Eighty years ago this month, the world watched in awe and admiration as the Soviet military’s self sacrifice shattered forever the myth of Nazi invincibility. 

MAJOR CONTRACT AWARDED, Logistik Unicorp to Provide Canadian Forces With Operational Clothing & Footwear

By David Pugliese

LOGISTIK UNICORP BASED in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, has received a significant contract to provide operational clothing and footwear to the Canadian Armed Forces for years to come.

The contract is valued at up to $3.7 billion over 20 years if all options are exercised.

The deal will see the delivery of approximately 1,222 different items of clothing and footwear worn by CAF members during their deployments. Included in the contract would be combat uniforms using Canadian Disruptive Pattern (CADPAT) camouflage; badges and insignias; footwear including combat boots, arid/hot weather boots, and mukluks; winter gear such as parkas, headwear and hand wear; and soldiers’ personal equipment, such as sleeping bags and day packs.

This contract will cover items for more than 160,000 people, including Regular and Reserve Force members, Canadian Rangers, Junior Rangers, search and rescue technicians, firefighters and cadets, according to the Department of National Defence. Also included are provisions to enable the ad hoc procurement of equipment required for unexpected deployment operations – such as the immediate supply of personal protective equipment during emergencies.

Once the contract is fully implemented, CAF members will be able to order items online and have orders shipped to their door, while also providing the CAF with the ability to continue distributing uniforms directly to units. This new approach will deliver better resource and inventory management for the CAF, improve item availability, and provide better value for taxpayers, according to the Department of National Defence.

Defence Minister Anita Anand visits Logistik Unicorp to announce the new contract for military clothing. (CANADIAN FORCES PHOTO)

Government officials say the deal will support over 3000 jobs in Canada’s clothing, footwear and textile industries.

Logistik Unicorp will invest in research and development and skills training in the textile, apparel and footwear sectors, which will generate additional jobs and export opportunities Defence Minister Anita Anand said the new contract with Logistik Unicorp will ensure that CAF members have the equipment they need, when they need it.

Currently, operational clothing and footwear items are being procured through multiple individual contracts. By combining the various contracts into one, the federal government believes it will achieve greater efficiency and availability of items the CAF needs and better value for taxpayers.

Logistik Unicorp based in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, has received a significant contract to provide operational clothing and footwear to the Canadian Armed Forces for years to come. (CANADIAN FORCES PHOTO)

Delivery of items to CAF clothing stores will commence during the second year of the contract, and individual online ordering capability is targeted to be implemented during the third year.

Since 1996, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces have been using a consolidated clothing contract for dress uniform (non-operational clothing). Additional functionalities for users have been added, including online ordering. This approach, renewed in 2020 as the Non-Operational Clothing and Footwear Contract with Logistik Unicorp Inc., continues to supply non-operational clothing for 160,000 Canadian Forces full-time personnel, reservists, and cadets. With the latest deal, DND says it is taking a similar approach to the procurement of operational clothing and footwear.

In addition, Logistik will be required to conform to mandatory requirements of the Canadian Content Policy, as well as to ensure that the manufacturing of clothing and footwear items continues to be done in Canada.

“Logistik Unicorp is proud to have been selected to continue supporting the Canadian Armed Forces with their supply and equipment needs, which our Canadian military members continue to proudly wear while serving around the world,” said Karine Bibeau, Vice-President, Client Experience at Logistik. “Part of what makes Logistik Unicorp’s uniform programs stand out is the relentless pursuit of innovation through research & develop- ment practices, and commitment to proactively help our clients improve their services.”

Logistik Unicorp is considered a Canadian leader in Man- aged Clothing Solutions for uniform and personal equipment.

It provides high-quality, innovative and functional clothing, footwear and equipment to more than 600,000 individuals worldwide, including 325,000 Canadians in various corporations, government departments and agencies. The firm provides a turnkey solution: IT systems, research and development, design, production, procurement, quality assurance, customer service, secure warehousing and distribution.

Logistik Unicorp has a supply chain and network of domestic and international partners, with the group’s subsidiaries in Aus- tralia, New Zealand, Germany, Tunisia and Vietnam serving a global customer base.

Canadian Surface Combatant, WATCHDOG SAYS SOMETHING HAS TO GIVE AS COSTS INCREASE

Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux has warned that the cost of the Canadian Surface Combatant continues to climb. (CSC IMAGE COURTESY LOCKHEED MARTIN)

By David Pugliese

IN LATE OCTOBER, Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux had more bad news for the Canadian Forces. The cost of the Canadian Surface Combatant, which is to replace the Royal Canadian Navy’s Halifax- class frigates, had increased once more.

Over a one-year period the projected cost had jumped by $7 billion, putting the estimated construction price tag for the 15 ships at $84.5 billion.

“This new evaluation takes into account revised production schedules and amended inflation projections,” Giroux said.

That cost is more than three times the actual $26 billion price tag that was officially approved for the CSC project by Treasury Board.

Giroux also outlined the entire life cycle cost for the ships, putting that at $306 billion. That last figure is a significant leap in cost for taxpayers; in 2013 the Auditor General’s office noted that figure would be $64 billion over 30 years.

“Every time we look at this (project), the costs go up,” Giroux noted.

The Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) project — the largest single expenditure in Canadian history — has become the poster child for the country’s troubled military procurement system. Concerns have been raised about a lack of accountability and oversight of the program as well as secrecy surrounding the initiative.

Construction of the first CSC warship isn’t scheduled to begin until 2024. The first ship is expected to be operational sometime after 2031. Lockheed Martin Canada has been selected as the main subcontractor with the CSC design based on the BAE Type 26 warship. The first of the Type 26-class being built for the Royal Navy is currently under construction in the United Kingdom.

More costs for CSC could soon emerge in 2023. Irving’s Halifax shipyard was selected in 2011 as the winner to build new fleets of warships for the navy, including CSC. Among the requirements for winning the bid was that the yard had the capability to build the vessels and taxpayers wouldn’t need to contribute funding to outfit the facilities for the task.

But Irving lobbied the federal government for additional money so it can modernize its facilities to build the CSC. Industry sources say the Liberals are considering providing at least $300 million to the shipyard owned by one of Canada’s richest families.

Conservative MP Kelly McCauley, a member of the Commons government operations committee that requested Giroux examine CSC, said he and some fellow MPs believe just the construction of the CSC alone will eventually cost more than $100 billion.

CSC was originally started by the previous Conservative government but by the summer of 2015, it was talking about limiting the increasing project costs by reducing the number of ships to be built. But the incoming Liberal government dismissed that notion and committed to all 15 warships.

Alan Williams, a former Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel at the Department of National Defence, has outlined three potential options for the CSC. The first is that the federal government ignores concerns and continues with the status quo; number two is the purchase U.S. frigates which are now under construction; and the third is to conduct a new and proper competitive procurement process for a renewed CSC project. As Williams has pointed out, the Canadian government appears to be opting for ignoring the various concerns about the project and forging ahead. “I feel for the Royal Canadian Navy,” said Williams. “They need new ships but if they continue down the current path with CSC they might not get any.”

As costs continue to rise and delays increase, National Defence is steadfast that it will not be altering course. Previously, National Defence officials claimed they didn’t expect the CSC price tag to increase.

In response to Giroux’s Oct. 27 report, National Defence acknowledged it does not yet have an idea how much the ship purchase will ultimately cost taxpayers. “The full cost for the project will continue to be refined” it noted. “Project costs will evolve throughout the duration of a project,” the department added.

The political leadership has shown no interest in making changes in the procurement. Defence Minister Anita Anand and deputy minister Bill Matthews have overseen the CSC project since early 2019, first when they were at Procurement Canada and now at National Defence. Anand has downplayed concerns about problems in the country’s military procurement system, instead stating that there are many success stories.

Giroux also told Esprit de Corps that he has seen no evidence that National Defence and the Royal Canadian Navy will make any changes. “I haven’t seen any significant change of path or course. There is no indication of that,” he added.

Equally worrisome is that neither National Defence nor the RCN have done a life-cycle costing for the Type 26 ships, or at least one they were prepared to share with the PBO. “I’m not aware they did a life cycle cost for the Type 26 or the surface combatants themselves,” Giroux explained. “The only number we saw was came from the Auditor General in 2013. But we haven’t seen anything since.”

There are several problems emerging with the CSC that are driving costs. There are the delays in beginning construction. Each year of delay will add billions of dollars to the price tag.

In addition, the weight of the ship has significantly increased since the original plan; the PBO now estimates the vessel will be 7,800 tonnes. That increase in weigh, in turn, boosts operating costs, Giroux told Esprit de Corps.

Another cost driver is technology. “It’s weapon systems that are more sophisticated,” Giroux pointed out. “It could also be size differential, the number of personnel.”

Another cost driver is the insistence of the federal government to build the ships in Canada. That adds a significant amount to the process but any change to that policy is for politicians to decide, Giroux said. “That’s a decision that the government has to make and parliamentarians have to debate as to whether this is the best value for money, taking into consideration the benefit of having a domestic building capacity or domestic shipyard capacity to build warships, as well as the benefits of of having the expertise domestically, as opposed to purchasing the ships from abroad, based on foreign designs,” he said.

As far as how much could be saved by building the CSC in an overseas shipyard, that depends on the actual design. “There are many unknowns,” Giroux explained. “But it’s clear that it would be significantly cheaper to have them built abroad.”

The increased maintenance and operations costs for the CSC will also have a ripple effect as it will draw money from the overall DND budget. At this point the PBO estimates that the operations and maintenance for the CSC will be twice the cost of what the RCN is now paying for O and M. “So that will eat a good chunk of DND’s operational budget,” he explained. “And if the Army also has tanks and other equipment they need to buy and operate and maintain and the fighter jets will have to be replaced, and if they have higher operating costs, that could be tough for DND.”

The BAE Type 26 Destroyer is Canada’s choice for our new CSC fleet.

With the rising CSC costs, the Canadian Forces and a future government will be facing some hard decisions. In addition to CSC, Canada has committed to the F-35 stealth fighter, which comes with a high maintenance and flying cost, as well as a major modernization of NORAD radar systems. In addition, there will be the other future modernization and re-equipment programs for the Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Forces.

“Either somebody is going be faced with a decision of reducing the number of ships or increasing the budget allocated to National Defence,” Giroux explained. “Every time we look at the estimate of the cost it goes up. There is delay after delay. And every time there is a delay the costs go up. So something has to give.”

“But who knows what decisions will have been made regarding the operating budget of DND and whether the government will stick to the decision to procurement 15 of the surface combat- ants,” Giroux added. “Maybe they’ll decide it is too much and it will lead to some trade-offs.”

ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY BEGINS LONG PROCESS TO REPLACE VICTORIA-CLASS SUBS

The Royal Canadian Navy has started the long process to replace its Victoria-class submarines (HMCS Windsor shown) by the late 2030s.(CANADIAN FORCES PHOTO)

By David Pugliese

THE CANADIAN PATROL Submarine Project (CPSP), part of the RCN’s Naval Force Development establishment, is actively analyzing the future operating environment to better understand the key capabilities and technologies that will be required of Canada’s next generation submarine, Royal Canadian Navy officers tell Esprit de Corps.

The four Victoria-class boats, originally known as the Upholder-class, were purchased second-hand from the Royal Navy and delivered between 2000 and 2004. Renamed as the Victoria-class,the subs have been deemed by the Canadian government as essential for the country’s security.

The boats are expected to continue operating until the late 2030s. But defence procurement takes time and the CanadianArmed Forces clearly understands that issue. “Recognizing that the Victoria-class submarines are scheduled to commence decommissioning in the late 2030’s and that defence procurement timelines for a complex project such as submarine replacement can take 15 years or more from project establishment to first delivery, the CAF required a submarine replacement project be initiated,” National Defence spokesman Dan Le Bouthillier explained to Esprit de Corps.

That process will inform timely governmental decision-making about a potential replacement class of submarines, and avoid any gap in submarine capability,” he added.“With this forward looking approach, the team is reaching out to partners from academia and defence scientists to consider such things as the potential impact of climate change for future operations in the Arctic, and how emerging technologies might be leveraged to increase the amount of time that submarines can stay deep,” Le Bouthillier noted.

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project team will also examine technologies that can be leveraged to support digitally enabled operations and increase survivability in future threat environments, relying on modern weapon systems, sensors and uncrewed systems, Le Bouthillier added. “They are research-ing the systems that will facilitate joint operations with Allies and partners in Europe and in the Indo Pacific, in addition to contributing to maritime domain awareness and the system of systems network enabling the continental defence of NorthAmerica, including the Arctic.

The project remains at a preliminary stage. The project team is responsible for analyzing all conventional options and responding to any questions the government may have, Le Bouthillier said.“Establishing a project to replace the Victoria-class in due course does not commit the government to any specific course of action, but instead preserves the time to make an informed decision when required,” Le Bouthillier noted.

Victoria-class submarines were recognized in the Canadian government’s defence policy, Strong Secure Engaged, as key contributors for national defence, capable of operating alone orin support of Naval Task Groups.Composed of up to four surface combatants, a joint support ship and a submarine when needed, Naval Task Groups are expected to form core operating forces that enable the RCN to sustain international blue water operations, while retaining the capability to contribute to operations in support of North American security and maintaining a presence in Canada’s three oceans.

While the Canadian Armed Forces is suggesting it could take 15 years for a submarine procurement, National Defence documents obtained by Esprit de Corps through the Access to Information law warn the process could take much longer. “The procurement timeline from project establishment to contract award is highly specific to the project but staff analysis has shown that the procurement of a new submarine class will take a minimum of 15 years total from project establishment to first delivery and could exceed 25 years depending on the adopted procurement strategy,” National Defence and military officials told then Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan in a Jan. 6, 2021 briefing note.

The Canadian Patrol Submarine Project office will start out small but will be incrementally augmented with “hand-selected submariners, engineers and procurement professionals,” Sajjan was told. The staff will follow the normal project activities leading to departmental government boards, an independent review panel for defence acquisition, and eventually approval by Treasury Board for the project to proceed.

“Significant analysis will be required to determine the design, fleet size, and build strategy,” Sajjan was told.

In its pitch to the Defence Minister the Royal Canadian Navy noted that submarines are a key element of the Canadian Armed Forces continental defence and are critical to the detection of foreign submarines.

Given that submarine technology is being exploited by non-state actors (e.g. Caribbean drug cartels) the significance of sub-surface MDA (maritime domain awareness)/maritime undersea surveillance is an important capability to retain and grow pursuant to recent departmental discussions,” Sajjan was told.

The current Defence Minister Anita Anand also received a similar briefing on the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, defence sources pointed out.

With a price tag for a future submarine fleet potentially in the tens of billions of dollars, selling federal politicians and the public on the need for a new underwater fleet will be critical. (On the issue of cost, Australia planned to spend $66 billion on purchasing 12 diesel-electric submarines from France. It scuttled that deal and now plans to purchase nuclear-powered submarines from a U.S.-British alliance at an estimated cost of $170 billion. Whether the Canadian public or government would accept similar costs remains highly doubtful).

The RCN has tried to promote the value of the submarines on missions to the Caribbean to support U.S.-led counter-narcotics missions as well as NATO operations in tracking Russian subs. The RCN also highlighted submarine activities in the Asia-Pacific.

In late 2017 and early 2018 HMCS Chicoutimi spent 200 days at sea in operations in the Asia-Pacific. The mission marked the first time in 50 years that a RCN submarine had operated in Japanese waters. The submarine also took part in the “Annual Exercise”, a bilateral training event between the USN and the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force.

Last year the RCN also launched a significant public relations campaign highlighting the need for a new submarine fleet, but the initiative comprising of a series of opinion articles from academics closely aligned with National Defence seem to have had little impact.

The crew of HMCS Victoria monitors instruments as the submarine slips under the waves for a routine patrol.(PHOTO BY DAVID PUGLIESE)

In the meantime, the maintenance of the existing Victoria-class submarine fleet is of critical importance to the RCN. Sustainment of submarines is a key industrial capability the Royal Canadian Navy aims to grow and develop in Canada.

Submarines are among the world’s most technically complex machines and they operate in an unforgiving environment, the RCN points out. The Victoria-class submarines operate in open-ocean and deep-sea environments where they experience pressure-induced stresses from changes in depth, extreme weather conditions, and the corrosive effects of seawater.

A strict in-service maintenance program is required to ensure the safety of the crew and mission success. It also helps develop and sustain a highly-skilled Canadian marine workforce with expertise in a specific domain, according to the Department of National Defence.

Upkeep of the Victoria-class boats is provided via a combination of Royal Canadian Navy and contracted maintenance resources. National Defence’s fleet maintenance facilities in both Halifax, NS and Esquimalt, BC are involved in submarine sustainment.

But the main player is private industry.

A contract for maintenance support of the Victoria-class was originally awarded to Babcock Canada Inc. (formerly the Canadian Submarine Management Group Inc.) in 2008. This contract was originally for a total value of approximately $2.9 billion and a maximum duration of 15 years if all options were exercised.

The Victoria-class In-Service Support Contract or VISSC is one of the largest naval in-service support contract in Canada and includes project management, refits and maintenance, capability upgrades, logistics, configuration/safety records and engineering support. The main contract covers core work and tasking with deep maintenance periods – termed Extended Docking Work Periods (EDWPs), included as required by the submarine operating schedules.

The work is done in Victoria (CFB Esquimalt), BC.

In May 2018 the Department of National Defence extended the existing submarine support contract with Babcock. That extension was out to June 2021 and involved a team of more than 400 Babcock engineers, project managers and specialist support staff continue to support all four submarines in refit and in-service.

Babcock Canada is recognized as a leading naval in-service support specialist with the ability to leverage international best practices from a wide range of similar navies and vessels around the world.

Since its inception in 2008 Babcock Canada has continued to grow and has now established facilities in Victoria, Halifax, and Ottawa, the company added.

In February 2022, the VISSC contract was further extended to 2025 in order to ensure continued and uninterrupted service is available for the submarine fleet, according to Le Bouthillier.

A new contract – dubbed VISSC II – is also on the horizon.Department of National Defence officials had stated that theVISSC II contract would be awarded by May 2022.

But more time is needed, confirmed Le Bouthillier and an analysis of sustainment options is underway.

The Government of Canada is currently engaging with industry on the development of a Request for Proposals (RFP) for VISSCII, Le Bouthillier added.

An Invitation to Qualify or ITQ for VISSC II was issued by the Canadian government in August 2019, and five prequalified bidders were announced in March 2020. Those included BAESystems (Canada) Inc.; Babcock Canada Inc.; Serco Inc. and Chantier Davie Canada Inc. in a Joint Venture carrying on business as the Canadian Submarine Alliance; Naval Group; and Thales Canada Inc. and Thales Australia Ltd. in a joint venture.

One of the pre-qualified bidders, Naval Group, has subsequently withdrawn from the process.

“At this time, project schedules are currently under review and we expect to communicate the revised timeline in due course,”Le Bouthillier said.

The scope of the future VISSC II contract is the subject of an ongoing study to ensure that the new contract will respond well to government priorities around performance, flexibility, value for money and economic benefits, he added.

The current annual recurring maintenance cost for the four Victoria-class submarines, including expenditures under the original VISSC, is in the range of $300 million to $350 million per year. The final value for the VISSC2 contract will depend on the number of years the contract is active and the scope of work.

The company winning the VISSC2 will be required to have an office in Ottawa and facilities on the east and west coast. All intensive third-line maintenance periods will take place at the Esquimalt Graving Dockyard in Victoria, BC.

The evaluation criteria for the winning bid will focus on demonstrated submarine sustainment and maintenance experience, access to an available and skilled workforce, ability to meet the criteria to become a tenant of the government owned submarine repair facilities at Esquimalt GravingDock and capability to support industrial benefits and value proposition initiatives.

The industrial and technological benefits and value proposition set up requires companies awarded defence procurement contracts to undertake business activity in Canada equal to the value of the contracts. Key industrial capabilities including critical industrial services as defined by the Canadian government. Those include marine ship-borne mission systems, sonar and acoustic systems, munitions, electro-optical support, training and simulation, armour, shipbuilding, design and engineering services and aerospace systems.

The original sustainment plan for VISSC2 called for two submarines at high readiness, one available as required and one in Extended Docking Work Period or EDWP. First and second line maintenance will be done primarily in-house. Third line maintenance will rest with industry.

The Royal Canadian Navy wants a 9 plus 3 Victoria-class operating cycle. The submarines would be involved in operations for a nine-year period, followed by a EDWP of three years.

MV ASTERIX: An Unexpected Shipbuilding Success Story

by David Pugliese

The U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey is refueled by MV Asterix during RIMPAC 2018. (US NAVY PHOTO)

THE BIGGEST SUCCESS story of the National Shipbuilding Strategy is actually one that was never planned for under the federal government’s initiative.

The 26,000-tonne MV Asterix, a commercial vessel converted for naval resupply purposes by Davie Shipbuilding in Quebec and leased to the Canadian government by the firm’s affiliate Federal Fleet Services, is now fully integrated into the Royal Canadian Navy’s fleet. Just months after being delivered in early 2018 to the military it was at sea supporting RCN and allied operations. The RCN has come to rely so much on Asterix – now its only supply vessel – that the service increased the days the ship was required almost immediately. And several months ago the RCN and Public Services and Procurement Canada announced it would extend the navy’s use of Asterix until 2025.

What wasn’t publicized is that for years federal bureaucrats fought against the Asterix project ever coming to fruition.

These days, however, with the National Shipbuilding Strategy having few real successes, Asterix is now hailed by the federal government as a triumph of government decision-making. In fact it was never envisioned as part of the NSS and was only developed because of the failure of the NSS to produce in a timely fashion the Joint Support Ships that are still on order.

The RCN had at one time operated three supply ships of its own but by 2014 all had been retired from service. Ongoing delays in the construction of the two Joint Support Ships prompted the then Conservative Party government in 2015 to enter into the deal with Davie and Federal Fleet for Asterix.

The Liberal government originally tried to derail the $670 million Asterix project shortly after being elected in the fall of 2015. But the Liberals eventually backed down after much pushback from the Quebec government and the shipyard and its workers. The Asterix project continued and the converted ship was delivered on time and on budget.

Asterix’s success still hasn’t stopped a PR campaign by some in the RCN to portray the vessel as less than capable. They claim Asterix isn’t a true military vessel. That is indeed true but those same officers don’t point out that the “true” military vessels – the Joint Support Ships – are now seven years behind schedule and double the cost.

Davie and Federal Fleet Services have also disputed the claim Asterix can’t go into a war zone. Company officials point out Asterix can be used in combat as the vessel has been outfitted with similar navigation and other systems that will eventually be installed on a new future fleet of Canadian warships. In addition, the company has acquired insurance coverage for the vessel to operate in high risk and war risk areas, Davie noted in a previous statement on its website.

The vessel can also be outfitted with advanced self-defence weapons, a capability Davie originally proposed to the Department of National Defence. But the installation of high-powered Phalanx guns – currently in storage in a military depot – was turned down by bureaucrats as a cost-saving measure. “The ship can go wherever the Canadian Armed Forces require it to go,” Davie said on its website in response to questions about whether Asterix can be used in combat.

Politics, and the protection of military and bureaucratic careers, have played a key role in efforts to limit the success of the Asterix project. In 2018 Davie offered the Asterix’s sister vessel, Obelix, for $500 million outright. The vessel could have been delivered to the RCN within 24 months, the firm noted.

From the point of view of military capability, the offer should have been immediately accepted, as the RCN should have two to three supply and refueling ships.

But it was rejected by the Canadian Forces and government. Why?

Acquiring such a capable ship quickly and at a low cost would have prompted questions why taxpayers were paying four times the amount and waiting years for a similar capability in the Joint Support Ships. It also would have raised embarrassing questions about why the NSS has failed to deliver on many of its promises.

CANADIAN SURFACE COMBATANT: Skyrocketing Costs Could Jeopardize Future Military Procurements

HMS Glasgow, a Type 26 frigate, is shown here under construction in the United Kingdom. The design is the basis for the Canadian Surface Combatant. (UK MOD PHOTO)

By Dvid Pugliese

SO FAR THE RESULTS of the strategy have been limited. A limited number of vessels have been launched. But the National Shipbuilding Strategy initiative has garnered more than its share of controversy because of ongoing delays in the building of ships and budget overruns.
At the centre of that controversy is the country’s main program associated with the shipbuilding strategy - the Canadian Surface Combatant or CSC.

That project to build 15 warships is the largest single purchase in Canadian history.

The budget for the CSC was originally approved by Treasury Board at $26 billion.

In 2021 Parliamentary budget officer Yves Giroux estimated the project had climbed to at least $77 billion. But Giroux warned the CSC price tag could go even higher as further delays in the project will continue to drive the price upwards.

His prediction appears to be coming true. This year, MPs on the House of Commons Government Operations Committee said they now expect the cost for the 15 ships to be around $100 billion (the federal government has yet to officially confirm that figure).

The CSC fleet, based on the Type 26 design from BAE, will be built at Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax. Lockheed Martin Canada is the main contractor overseeing the project.

The first warship was supposed to have been delivered in 2025. But the Department of National Defence revealed Feb. 1 that the delivery of that vessel would now be delayed until 2030 or 2031. DND, however, has acknowledged it doesn’t know when the first CSC will actually be ready for operations. “We expect delivery of the first ship in 2030/2031, followed by an extensive sea trials period that will include weapons certification and the correspond- ing training of RCN sailors, leading to final acceptance,” National Defence spokeswoman Jessica Lamirande explained. No dates, however, were provided on when that final acceptance of the first ship would happen.

While the Liberal government says it is committed to the CSC project the actual construction contract has yet to be signed. So far, taxpayers have spent $738.7 million to support the options analysis and design phases of the surface combatant project.

Critics say there is still time for the Liberal government to exit from the increasingly expensive and risky program.

But that appears unlikely as the government has already started the process of acquiring some of the systems needed for at least the first three warships. In May of last year the U.S. government announced Canada requested four radars and four combat systems for the surface combatant project. Three radars and three combat systems would be for the installation on the first three ships. The fourth radar and combat system would be used by Canada at a test facility to be built in Dartmouth, NS.

Warning signs, however, have been building for years about problems with the CSC .

The Conservative government originally started the surface combatant project but in 2015 it acknowledged the cost was getting out of control and the program might have to be scaled back with the number of ships being cut.

But when the Liberal government came to power later that year the warnings were ignored. No changes were made to the project or how it was run. The result was that the costs significantly increased.

Parliamentary budget officer Giroux told MPs last year that part of the risk with the CSC project came from the Royal Canadian Navy’s decision to select the Type 26 frigate, which at the time existed only on the drawing board. “There doesn’t seem to be a clear rationale when it comes to explaining these cost increases,” Giroux noted during his appearance at a Commons committee last year. “I’m concerned.”

The entry of the Type 26 warship in the Canadian competition has indeed been controversial from the start and sparked complaints the procurement process was skewed to favour that vessel. Previously, the Liberal government said that only mature existing designs or designs of ships already in service with other navies would be accepted, on the grounds they could be built faster and would be less risky. Unproven designs can face challenges as problems are found once the vessel is in the water and operating. The criteria was later changed by the Canadian government for reasons that are not entirely clear. (The other ships that were in the Canadian competition were all proven and in service with allied navies.)

The Department of National Defence, however, has stood firm on its view the project is proceeding without major problems. DND officials have rejected the PBO’s cost estimates.

Instead they claim the overall CSC project cost will be between $56 billion and $60 billion. DND officials have insisted the cost will not go up beyond those figures and that the department has no intention of changing course or considering anything but the Type 26 design.

Troy Crosby, the assistant deputy minister of materiel at the DND, has denied the CSC project is in trouble. “I wouldn’t call it trouble,” he explained in 2021. “Is it hard? Is it challenging work? Absolutely. But I wouldn’t say we’re in trouble.”

In fact, last year the DND boasted to parliament that military equipment procurement is not only well managed but all programs are within budget and on schedule.

But Conservative MP Kelly McCauley, one of the few politicians who have raised concerns about the skyrocketing CSC cost, said that claim shows the DND is “detached from reality” when it comes to procurement.

Problems have also started to emerge in Australia, which is also building a new surface combatant fleet based on the Type 26 design. An Australian Defence department “engineer- ing team assessment” of the country’s frigate procurement highlighted concerns about the untested “immature” Type 26 ship design. The Australian defence department assessment – revealed in February by media outlets in that country – warned the new frigates would be “substantially” slower and have less range than originally intended. The assessment also noted the ship is heavier than originally planned and that will result in “increased fuel consumption and running costs.” The Australian defence engineering team warned it has “low confidence” the new vessels will meet the Royal Australian Navy’s needs.

The Royal Canadian Navy’s surface combatant is shown in this artist’s concept. (IMAGE COURTESY LOCKHEED MARTIN)

Canada’s Department of National Defence responded to the Australian report by noting the Type 26 ship design “is being evolved to meet Canadian requirements for a single class that meets the RCN’s needs.”

Canadian defence officials are also in regular contact with British and Australian officials involved in the construction of the Type 26 for their respective countries. “It should be recognized, however, that although the three nations are building ships based on a common Type 26 parent design, country specific requirements are such that the individual designs and design challenges are not always common between the three countries,” the DND added.

“With a base design completed and lessons learned from the build process on other programs, Canada’s overall risk is reduced,” Lockheed Martin added. “It is also important to highlight that Australia and Canada each have unique mission requirements and domestic industrial capabilities. Canada’s adjustments to the base design will meet the Royal Canadian Navy’s unique requirements, such as stealth and survivability, while also benefiting from progress achieved by allied countries using this design.”

While DND officials have been able to brush off issues with the Australian Type 26 frigates, another problem is looming on the horizon. Irving has recently come back to the federal government to argue that it needs hundreds of millions of tax dollars to upgrade its Halifax yard so it can build the CSC.

When Irving’s Halifax shipyard was selected in 2011 as the winner to build the new frigates and other combat vessels, among the requirements for winning the bid was that the yard had the capability to actually build the vessels. Under no circumstances would taxpayers need to contribute funding to outfit the facilities for the task.

But Irving has now presented the Liberal government with a request for at least $300 million (some reports indicate $500 million) so it can begin the construction of the CSC. The Liberal government is considering providing funds to the shipyard owned by one of Canada’s richest families.

Shortly before he left Irving Shipbuilding, the firm’s president Kevin Mooney told the Canadian Press news service that the shipyard needs several upgrades that were not originally anticipated for the CSC. Irving declined to discuss how much money it is seeking from taxpayers or what it would do with the funding if it was received.

But Mary Keith, Irving’s vice president of communications, said the Halifax Shipyard is on track to cut steel on the first surface combatant in 2024. “As is typical in any shipyard transitioning to a larger and more complex ship, (Irving Shipbuilding) has developed plans to optimize cost, schedule, and quality,” she noted in an email. “The business case demonstrates the significant benefit to the CSC program.”

Critics point out the procurement of the CSC is a textbook case in how not to acquire military equipment. They have also raised concerns about a lack of accountability for the overall program. Even though the original budget has increased from $25 billion to $100 billion, not one federal official has resigned or been fired.

Also absent are any real attempts to bring the costs under control.

Alan Williams, the former assistant deputy minister in charge of procurement at DND, likens the CSC to a train rolling down a hill without brakes. “You’re heading for disaster,” he warns. As the project’s eye-watering cost continues to increase, questions emerge about how other military programs might be affected. Will there be money for the Canadian Army for instance for its future needs if the government continues with a $100 billion frigate program?
Williams has argued that the C SC alone will draw between $213.5 and $219.6 billion dollars from defence budgets over a 30-year period when life-cycle costs are figured into the equation. Those costs are bound to jeopardize other equipment programs for the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces, he argues.

Williams and others suggest Canada could build an initial three Type 26 ships and then purchase other warships based on a proven design at a much reduced cost.

The PBO looked at such a scenario, presenting a cost analysis of two other ship designs: the FREMM European multi-mission frigate and the Type 31e, a class of general-purpose frigates planned for the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy. The cost of acquiring 15 FREMM ships is estimated at $71.1 billion, while the cost of a fleet of 15 ships based on the Type 31e design is estimated at $27.5 billion, the PBO noted. The PBO analysis also considered the cost of a mixed fleet: three of the Type 26 ships and 12 ships of either of the alternate designs. Under this scenario the costs increase to $71.9 billion for the mixed Type 26 and FREMM fleet, and $37.5 billion for the mixed Type 26 and Type 31e fleet.

DELAY HAS SILVER LINING, Asterix’s service to Royal Canadian Navy to be extended

by David Pugliese

The Canadian government is in discussions with Federal Fleet Services to further extend the support the Motor Vessel (MV) Asterix provides to the Royal Canadian Navy. The extension is needed because of additional delays to the Joint Support Ship project, said Simon Page, assistant deputy minister for defence and marine procurement at Public Services and Procurement Canada. The first Joint Supply Ship won’t be delivered until 2025 and the second won’t arrive until 2027, Page confirmed to Esprit de Corps.

The Canadian government is in discussions with Federal Fleet Services to further extend the support the Motor Vessel (MV) Asterix provides to the Royal Canadian Navy. (DAVID PUGLIESE PHOTO)

The MV Asterix was initially contracted into service in January 2018 for a five-year period with the option to extend by up to five additional one-year increments. “The ongoing discussions are to exercise two of the one year option periods to extend the term of the contract for the interim use of the MV Asterix until January 2025, as requested by the Department of National Defence,” PSPC spokeswoman Katherine Proulx told Esprit de Corps.

She said at this point it is not known exactly when the new arrangement will be put in place. “The intent is that the agreement is in place prior to the expiry of the current service period in January 2023,” she added. Asterix has come a long way since it was unveiled on July 20, 2017 at the Davie yards in front of Canadian Armed Forces senior leaders and federal, provincial and municipal politicians.

The Asterix project involved the conversion of a modern, European-built containership into an Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ship. (DAVID PUGLIESE PHOTO)

The 26,000-tonne Asterix, a commercial vessel converted for naval resupply purposes by Davie Shipbuilding in Quebec and leased to the Canadian government by the firm’s affiliate Federal Fleet Services, has been fully integrated into the RCN’s fleet for years now.

The $670 million project has provided the RCN for the first time since 2015 with its own capability to refuel and resupply its ships. The vessel is seen as an interim Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ship until the Joint Support Ship fleet is built and delivered. Asterix is the largest naval platform in service with the RCN and provides a wide range of functions from at-sea replenishment of fuels and cargo to aviation support, fleet medical support and humanitarian and disaster relief.

The project involved the conversion of a modern, Europeanbuilt containership into an Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ship. Under a lease agreement, Federal Fleet Services is providing the ship and a civilian crew to operate the vessel. Royal Canadian Navy personnel are on board to handle communications and the actual transfer of supplies and fuel to warships.

The price tag includes the conversion of Asterix, the lease of its services to the Royal Canadian Navy for five years, maintenance and the salaries of a civilian crew to operate the vessel.

Asterix is able to carry two Royal Canadian Air Force Cyclone maritime helicopters and also has medical facilities on board. If needed, it could carry a Chinook helicopter.

In addition, it has space for light armoured vehicles and other equipment.

The RCN has a commanding officer on board the vessel to oversee military personnel while that officer does tactical level liaison with Federal Fleet Services, directing how the ship is used for the Navy’s operations.

The size of the RCN crew fluctuates. It can range from 45 to 67 sailors, depending on the training or operations underway.

Besides sailors trained in replenishment duties, there are medical, dental, engineering and communications personnel from the Canadian Armed Forces serving on the ship. Asterix is outfitted with six .50 calibre machineguns but Phalanx weapon systems can be added if needed. (Davie originally proposed to the Department of National Defence that Phalanx guns be installed but that was turned down by bureaucrats as a costsaving measure.)

Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, said Asterix’s role is important as it allows sailors to continue using their skills in replenishing ships at sea. “Asterix is extremely helpful because it allows us to put sailors on board the ship so they maintain the skills with the delivery of fuel to the receiving vessel,” he explained to Esprit de Corps. “And Asterix, even though it only operates in one ocean at a time, does have crews of those sailors and the enablers from both coasts, to make sure that both coasts sustain that skill.”

Davie offered to sell the Liberal government a second similar ship, Obelix, at a cost of around $500 million. The proposed deal had the support of the Conservative Party as well. The vessel could be delivered to the RCN within 24 months, Davie noted in its proposal.

In addition, the Senate’s defence committee recommended the federal government not only buy Asterix outright but purchase Obelix. It originally suggested that deal be put in place by 2018. The Liberal government, however, rejected the proposal.

The federal government does not appear to be changing course on that decision, even with the further delays of the Joint Support Ships. “We are currently in discussion with Federal Fleet Services to extend the current contract that we have with them for the services of the Asterix,” Page responded to a question about the potential purchase of Obelix. “There is no, there is no discussion about a purchase.”

The Liberal government originally tried to derail the Asterix project shortly after being elected in the fall of 2015. The move came after cabinet ministers, including Scott Brison and then Defence Minister Harjit Sajjan received a letter from the Irving family with a complaint that an Irving proposal for a similar supply ship was not examined properly. Irving has denied any suggestion it was involved in political meddling.

The Liberals eventually backed down after the Quebec government and shipyard workers in the province accused it of trying to scuttle the Davie Asterix deal. In addition, there was a penalty fee of $89 million if the federal government decided not to proceed with the Asterix project. Conversion of Asterix was ultimately approved by the Liberal government and the ship was delivered on time and on budget.

PURCHASE OF NEW CANADIAN SPECIAL FORCES VEHICLE TO FACE MORE DELAYS

The acquisition of a new Canadian special forces vehicle will replace the existing fleet of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) show here. (DAVID PUGLIESE PHOTO)

By David Pugliese

A REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS was supposed to be issued this year for a fleet of Next Generation Fighting Vehicles (NGFV). But that won’t be happening, according to officials with the Department of National Defence. DND intends to procure approximately 55 to 75 NGFVs to provide the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) with a tactical multi-role vehicle for their specific and unique tasks and roles. The NGFV will replace the existing fleet of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), which will soon exceed their life expectancy.

The Department of National Defence had initially expected a request for bids to be issued in the spring of 2021. That, however, slipped to sometime in 2022 because of COVID-19 related issues.

At this point, the schedule has once again been revised with a request for proposals to be issued in the fall of 2023 to qualified suppliers. But even that could slip further.

DND plans to release sometime this fall a revised procurement schedule as well as details about which companies have qualified to provide bids. The new delays are “in part a result of COVID restrictions over the past 2 years, but mainly due to a change to a more tailored and structure procurement approach as per guidance offered by industry,” said National Defence spokeswoman Jessica Lamirande. The project is still estimated to cost between $100 million and $249 million.

The key mission of the NGFV is Direct Action (DA), according to CANSOFCOM. The DA mission is to enable tactical manoeuvre of personnel and equipment into operational zones including directly onto objectives and to support the extraction of other assets, it added. “To accomplish this mission, the NGFV must possess key components to address lethality, mobility and survivability,” CANSOFCOM noted in a statement. “The NGFV requirement will include a modern electronics and communications architecture that will allow the NFGV to operate with the current communications, sensors and surveillance equipment utilized by the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command. In addition, the lethality capabilities will be modernized with the incorporation of a Remote Weapons System into the NGFV. “

The NGFV fleet is expected to be comprised of two variants; one type would be for combat and other for support. The Combat Variant would be designed to move a minimum of four personnel equipped with full combat personal protective equipment, personal weapons and combat supplies. This variant is expected to be equipped with one of three different weapon station configurations: a remote weapons station or RWS; a RWS with Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) capability; and a Crewed Turret.

The SIG Sauer P320 handgun is being introduced into service by CANSOFCOM. U.S. military personnel also use the same pistol. (U.S. DOD PHOTO)

From October 28 to November 15, 2019, four potential suppliers showcased their vehicles for CANSOCOM at the demonstration held at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa.

CANSOFCOM operators and technicians examined and drove the vehicles through a course with different types of terrain, such as trails, steep inclines and sand. They were then able to provide their feedback directly to the NGFV procurement team.

CANSOFCOM has declined to name the suppliers who demonstrated their vehicles. Meanwhile, CANSOFCOM leadership has announced it is moving ahead to bring into service “a newly procured pistol.”

Strangely, CANSOFCOM claims it can’t discuss the type of handgun that was purchased because it does not discuss equipment acquisitions for reasons of operational security. (This claim is false in that the command has indeed discussed equipment procurements and has released photos of such equipment). It is known already publicly, however, that the Canadian government spent $680,425 for the purchase of the SIG Sauer P320 handgun for CANSOFCOM.

The introduction into service of the P320 was temporarily delayed after a member of Joint Task Force 2 accidently shot himself with his handgun during training in Ottawa in the fall of 2020.

The incident, which resulted in a flesh wound, prompted a temporary halt to Canadian special forces training with the P320, a development reported by CBC in February 2021. At the same time, SIG Sauer issued a statement noting it was “working with Canadian Special Operations Forces Command to resolve an incident involving the unintended discharge of a P320.” The gun in question had been extensively tested and found to be safe, the firm noted. “The investigation revealed the use of an incorrect holster not designed for a P320,” SIG Sauer added in its statement.

In its statement issued June 22, 2022, CANSOFCOM noted that an investigation into the November 2020 incident “concluded the weapon is technically sound and functioned according to the technical requirements.”

GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE: Back On The Agenda For Canadian Army

by David Pugliese

AFTER YEARS OF being without a ground-based air defence, the Canadian Armed Forces is ready to begin the process to acquire a system capable of shooting down enemy aircraft, missiles and drones.

Federal government procurement specialists will request information from the defence industry sometime this year as the Canadian Army works out the specifics of what it wants in such a system.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown the value of air defence systems. Here Canadian soldiers train with a man-portable air- defence system (MANPAD). (CANADIAN FORCES PHOTO)

Defence analysts and retired generals have pointed to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as evidence of the need for such equipment. The Liberal government originally outlined the pro- posed purchase in its 2018 defence capability plan. At that point, the government stated such a ground-based air defence system would cost between $250 million and $499 million.

But, even before the procurement process has begun in earnest, that price tag has increased to what observers are saying is a more realistic cost estimate. During an April 5 brief- ing in Ottawa, Canadian Army officials told defence industry representatives the cost would now be between $500 million and $1 billion.

A contact is expected to be awarded in 2026 and the first systems would be in place a year later, industry officials were told. Interestingly, Army officers consider the main threats the new system would be used to deal with are rocket, artillery and mortar munitions, air to surface missiles and bombs, and remotely piloted

aircraft systems.”
During the April 5 briefing, industry officials were informed the

system would also be able to target cruise missiles, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The new system wouldn’t be capable of dealing with larger weapons, such as theatre ballistic missiles or intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The Canadian Army will consider systems with guns or missiles or both. It still has to examine whether it wants the air defence system mounted on light armoured vehicles or something smaller, such as trucks.

The Canadian Army was outfitted in 1989 with a then state- of-the art air defence anti-tank system known as ADATS, shown here during military exercises. But, faced with budget cuts ordered by the Conservative government, the Army announced it was removing ADATS from service in 2012. (CANADIAN FORCES PHOTO)

The package could also include a sensor suite, fire control software and an integrated networked C4ISR system. It would be equipped with a training and simulation system that leverages modelling and simulation to provide realistic and immersive training, according to the Canadian Armed Forces.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown the value of air defence systems, according to defence analysts. Ukraine has been able to prevent Russia’s air force from controlling the skies over the battlefield using a variety of anti-aircraft missiles and weapons. The war has also highlighted a gap in the Canadian military’s capabilities as it has been without an air defence system for the past decade.

The Canadian Army was outfitted in 1989 with a then state-of-the art air defence anti-tank system known as ADATS. It was purchased to protect bases in Germany against attack by the Russians, but, shortly after ADATS was delivered, the Cold War ended and the systems were shipped back to Canada. ADATS was occasionally used for domestic security, including to provide protection from potential air threats during the G8 summit in Alberta in 2002.

But, faced with budget cuts ordered by the Conservative government, the Army announced it was removing ADATS from service in 2012.

The move left the Canadian Forces without a primary air defence system. Army officers acknowledged at the time that decision was risky, but the service had determined it was accept- able in the short term. The Army had plans to introduce a new air defence system around 2017, but that project never went forward.

In 2020, then Army commander Lt.-Gen. Wayne Eyre told Esprit de Corps that ground-based air defence was a priority for the service. “We see the evolving threat from drones, from rockets, and other forms of indirect fire,” said Eyre, who has since been promoted to Chief of the Defence Staff. “We have to be able to protect ourselves.”

He noted that sophisticated sensors capable of identifying the location of enemy positions as well as detecting incoming warheads would be particularly important for ground-based air defence. CANADA’S ADATS

Back in the 1990s, the Canadian Army was one of the few military organizations operating the ADATS, which had been designed to provide air defence protection for mobile troops as well as ground installations. That self-contained weapon system was mounted on a tracked M113 and capable of performing during day or night and in adverse weather. ADATS was operated by a crew of three (driver, commander/radar operator, and electro-optical operator), plus three personnel in a support vehicle, according to the Canadian Armed Forces. It carried eight ready-to-fire missiles which traveled at a speed of Mach 3+ to a range of over eight kilometres. Its sensors included search radar and an electro-optical device contained a TV and Forward Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR).

ADATS first entered service with the Air Defence Artillery School located at CFB Chatham N. B. in 1989, with 34 units purchased. It was considered state-of-the-art at the time.

But after a series of budget cuts, the Canadian Army decided to shed its the ground based air defence capability. In 2005, the Army determined that the primary role of ADATS was “to be direct fire” with air defence a secondary role.

But the Army’s efforts to dump GBAD were met with serious concern, particularly in the Royal Canadian Air Force. The office of then Maj.-Gen. Charles Bouchard tried to push back against the Army, according to 2005 documents obtained by Esprit de Corps.

“While understood and not unexpected, this planned reduction in GBAD capability is happening at a time when the asymmetric threat and associated response dictates that the requirement for such a capability remains valid,” Bouchard’s office responded in a 2005 briefing note for the Canadian Army.

While the Army commander saw little need to maintain GBAD for an expeditionary role, Bouchard’s office countered with the following: “This capability does have a utility from both a NORAD and a domestic operations perspective.”

In fact, during a May 2005 NORAD planning conference, the joint U.S.-Canadian air defence command had identified the requirement “for a rapidly deployable” air defence capability for national special security events or important gatherings such as a G8 conference, according to the records.

But the RCAF’s concerns only delayed the inevitable. Almost all ADATS were declared surplus, and except for a few units for testing and support, the GBAD capability all but disappeared in 2012.