MV ASTERIX: An Unexpected Shipbuilding Success Story

by David Pugliese

The U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Dewey is refueled by MV Asterix during RIMPAC 2018. (US NAVY PHOTO)

THE BIGGEST SUCCESS story of the National Shipbuilding Strategy is actually one that was never planned for under the federal government’s initiative.

The 26,000-tonne MV Asterix, a commercial vessel converted for naval resupply purposes by Davie Shipbuilding in Quebec and leased to the Canadian government by the firm’s affiliate Federal Fleet Services, is now fully integrated into the Royal Canadian Navy’s fleet. Just months after being delivered in early 2018 to the military it was at sea supporting RCN and allied operations. The RCN has come to rely so much on Asterix – now its only supply vessel – that the service increased the days the ship was required almost immediately. And several months ago the RCN and Public Services and Procurement Canada announced it would extend the navy’s use of Asterix until 2025.

What wasn’t publicized is that for years federal bureaucrats fought against the Asterix project ever coming to fruition.

These days, however, with the National Shipbuilding Strategy having few real successes, Asterix is now hailed by the federal government as a triumph of government decision-making. In fact it was never envisioned as part of the NSS and was only developed because of the failure of the NSS to produce in a timely fashion the Joint Support Ships that are still on order.

The RCN had at one time operated three supply ships of its own but by 2014 all had been retired from service. Ongoing delays in the construction of the two Joint Support Ships prompted the then Conservative Party government in 2015 to enter into the deal with Davie and Federal Fleet for Asterix.

The Liberal government originally tried to derail the $670 million Asterix project shortly after being elected in the fall of 2015. But the Liberals eventually backed down after much pushback from the Quebec government and the shipyard and its workers. The Asterix project continued and the converted ship was delivered on time and on budget.

Asterix’s success still hasn’t stopped a PR campaign by some in the RCN to portray the vessel as less than capable. They claim Asterix isn’t a true military vessel. That is indeed true but those same officers don’t point out that the “true” military vessels – the Joint Support Ships – are now seven years behind schedule and double the cost.

Davie and Federal Fleet Services have also disputed the claim Asterix can’t go into a war zone. Company officials point out Asterix can be used in combat as the vessel has been outfitted with similar navigation and other systems that will eventually be installed on a new future fleet of Canadian warships. In addition, the company has acquired insurance coverage for the vessel to operate in high risk and war risk areas, Davie noted in a previous statement on its website.

The vessel can also be outfitted with advanced self-defence weapons, a capability Davie originally proposed to the Department of National Defence. But the installation of high-powered Phalanx guns – currently in storage in a military depot – was turned down by bureaucrats as a cost-saving measure. “The ship can go wherever the Canadian Armed Forces require it to go,” Davie said on its website in response to questions about whether Asterix can be used in combat.

Politics, and the protection of military and bureaucratic careers, have played a key role in efforts to limit the success of the Asterix project. In 2018 Davie offered the Asterix’s sister vessel, Obelix, for $500 million outright. The vessel could have been delivered to the RCN within 24 months, the firm noted.

From the point of view of military capability, the offer should have been immediately accepted, as the RCN should have two to three supply and refueling ships.

But it was rejected by the Canadian Forces and government. Why?

Acquiring such a capable ship quickly and at a low cost would have prompted questions why taxpayers were paying four times the amount and waiting years for a similar capability in the Joint Support Ships. It also would have raised embarrassing questions about why the NSS has failed to deliver on many of its promises.