WAR IN UKRAINE: Lessons For Canada’s Military and Defence Industries

By David Pugliese

Ukraine is unique in some ways as it involves the first time in decades that a major land war between two adversaries using modern conventional weapons has been waged.

Counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have, for the most part, dominated western military operations since 2001.

Canadian military leaders haven’t publicly talked about the lessons they are gathering from the war in Ukraine. 

In contrast, however, Christine Wormuth, Secretary of the US Army, has highlighted a series of lessons already being gathered from the battlefield. Among those are the importance of leadership, discipline and training as well as the value of having a top-notch logistics system in place, noted Wormuth at a conference several months ago. In addition she pointed to the need for a strong military industrial base, defences against drones and the ongoing maintenance of large stockpiles of munitions.

Although some of these lessons, such as accumulating large amounts of ammunition, would be difficult to accomplish for Canada because of the cost, other lessons could be seen as potentially important for the future.

ARTILLERY STILL DOMINATES THE BATTLEFIELD

In 1944 near the end of the Second World War, Russian dictator Joseph Stalin said in a speech that artillery was “the god of war.” The conflict between Ukraine and Russia almost 80 years later has shown that little has changed. 

“This is an artillery war now,” Vadym Skibitsky, deputy head of Ukraine’s military intelligence told the Guardian newspaper June 10.

Ukrainian government officials say a continued supply of artillery shells is critical to their war effort. Russia has large stocks of artillery and ammunition for its guns. Ukraine is firing between 5,000 and 6,000 artillery rounds a day at Russian positions, its military officials say.

But Ukrainian officials and defence analysts estimate Russia is firing an estimated 20,000 artillery rounds a day. Some Ukrainian government officials claim that figure is as high as 60,000 rounds but those numbers can’t be confirmed.

Canada has a modest artillery component of modern M-777 howitzers, originally purchased for the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Shortly after the Russian invasion started in late February, the Liberal government sent Ukraine four of the 37 M-777 howitzers owned by the Canadian Army. 

Providing Ukraine with ammunition for the 155mm artillery has been a little more challenging. Canada financed the purchase of 20,000 rounds at a cost of $98 million. The artillery shells are coming from the U.S. 

In addition, Canadian officials have been in discussions with their counterparts in South Korea since May to acquire the 100,000 rounds of 155mm artillery ammunition. Canada would then provide that ammunition – to come from South Korea’s stockpile – to Ukraine.

AIR DEFENCE

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shown the value of modern air defence systems. Ukraine has been able to prevent Russia’s air force from controlling the skies over the battlefield using a variety of anti-aircraft missiles and weapons. 

The war has also highlighted a major gap in the Canadian military’s capabilities as it has been without an air defence system for the past decade.

The Canadian Army was outfitted in 1989 with a then state-of-the art air defence anti-tank system known as ADATS. It was purchased to protect bases in Germany against attack by the Russians, but, shortly after ADATS was delivered, the Cold War ended and the systems were shipped back to Canada. ADATS was occasionally used for domestic security, including to provide protection from potential air threats during the G8 summit in Alberta in 2002.

But, faced with budget cuts ordered by the Conservative government, the Canadian Army announced it was removing ADATS from service in 2012. The move left the Canadian Forces without a primary air defence system. Army officers acknowledged at the time that decision was risky, but the service had determined it was acceptable in the short term.

But the gap has been anything but short term. A new air defence system is on the books but a contact isn’t expected to be awarded until 2026. The first systems would be in place in 2027, defence industry officials have been told. 

That means the “short term gap” will have been at least 15 years.

Canadian Army officers say a new air defence system will be focused on dealing with incoming rockets, artillery and mortar munitions, as well as remotely piloted aircraft systems (aka drones/ UAVs). 

Having defensive capabilities against drones has become particularly important during fighting in Ukraine. Both sides are using the UAVs for reconnaissance or to spot targets for artillery. Armed drones have also been used to take out tanks. “Drones and other unmanned systems are going to pose significant challenges for us, again, part of why we’re looking at modernizing our air and missile defense system,” Wormuth said of the U.S. Army’s lessons learned initiative.

ANTI-TANK WEAPONS

Tanks have played a major role in this war. And anti-tank systems have emerged as being equally as critical to destroying armoured vehicles.

Ukraine claims to have destroyed at 2,000 Russian tanks, although some sources put the number at about half of that. Destruction of other Russian armoured vehicles has been put at more than 3,000.

Whatever, the actual numbers, the war has highlighted the value of effective anti-tank systems on the modern battlefield. Such weapons have become so critical in the conflict that a popular Internet meme from Ukraine depicts a saint-like figure holding a Javelin anti-tank missile.

The conflict has also highlighted Canada’s gap in such weapons. In news media interviews, retired Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier complained about the Canadian Army’s reliance on aging Carl Gustaf anti-tank systems and its lack of modern anti-tank weapons.

What Hillier neglected to mention was that when he was CDS, the then Liberal government had approved $194 million for the purchase of either the Javelin or the Israeli-made Spike missile system. Companies put their bids in to provide 840 missiles and more than 100 firing systems. Test firings of both weapons was conducted. But a year later the bids were rejected as the Army determined it didn’t have enough information to figure out whether the weapons would be effective on the battlefield. The project then went by the wayside.

There are, however, new initiatives under way for the Canadian Army. It has plans to improve its anti-tank capabilities with a new generation system as well as giving the M72 Light Anti-Tank Armour Weapon more punch and a new role. The Army wants a fifth generation anti-tank system. The new weapon would be non-line-of-sight and could be operated in a fire-and- forget mode. The range would be 4,000 to 5,000 metres and the system would be carried by two soldiers. The aim of the Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) program would be to find a replacement for the legacy Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) anti-tank weapon system.

Acquisition would be in 2027 with the first systems arriving in 2028-2029 timeframe, according to the Army. Final delivery would take place in 2032-2033. 

A NEED FOR CHEAPER HIGH TECH EQUIPMENT

The war of attrition between Ukraine and Russia has highlighted the need for more cost effective high-tech military equipment. Nowhere is that more evident than in the selection of drones being used during the fighting.

Ukraine has relied on the low cost, Turkish-built Bayraktar TB2 UAV. Because of the low cost, countries operating such equipment can afford higher rates of attrition, particularly when compared to the higher-end systems on the market. A TB2 is said to cost between $1 million and $2 million. Compare that to $20 million for similar U.S.-made aircraft. “The TB2 and its accompanying munitions combine technical abilities with an affordability that means their commanders can tolerate some attrition while presenting real challenges to the enemy,” noted Britain’s defence minister Ben Wallace.

Ukraine has reportedly lost 8 of its TB2 drones. Russia is said to have lost hundreds of drones and is now looking at purchasing lower cost UAVs from Iran.

THE ACHILLES’ HEEL OF MODERN CONVENTIONAL WAR

The conflict in Ukraine has exposed the Achilles’ heel of modern militaries fighting a conventional war with a near peer enemy. That weakness is the destruction of massive amounts of high tech equipment which require a lengthy process to replace.

Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24. The losses on both sides are staggering. Ukraine is believed to have destroyed some 170 Russian helicopters and 800 drones. Russia has almost run out of precision-guided munitions. 

Ukraine has faced the destruction of a large number of tanks and armoured vehicles and depletion of ammunition stocks. That has forced it to beg NATO nations to resupply its military forces. The U.S. and other NATO nations have rushed to Ukraine large amounts of Javelin anti-tank missiles, Stinger missiles, ammunition, and armoured vehicles.

But now NATO nations are becoming more reluctant to part with their equipment as shortages in their own stockpiles emerge.

“Some allies are now raising the issue of whether these stocks are depleted too much,” NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg acknowledged to journalists on Sept. 9. He did not outline which allies have raised concerns.

The problem is that many modern weapons are highly reliant on sophisticated electronics and other components now in high demand. In addition, the pandemic has also created issues with supply chains and the availability of workers.

Lockheed Martin’s chief executive Jim Taiclet told CBS on May 8 that the firm is boosting Javelin production from 2,100 missiles a year to 4,000 per year. Getting to that goal, however, will take as long as two years because of supply chain problems, he added.

Greg Hayes, Raytheon’s chief executive, told investment analysts April 26 that the firm may not be able to produce more Stingers until at least 2023 due to parts shortages. That is because some Stinger components are no longer being made, forcing Raytheon to use other electronics.

Another issue is that the U.S. Department of Defense stopped buying Stingers some 18 years ago. That, in turn, limited production as the firm relied on smaller orders from international customers.

Even when orders are placed, it still takes time to fill them. Saab announced Sept. 7 that it had received from the U.S. military an $81 million order for Carl Gustaf ammunition and AT4s, a single shot shoulder fired weapon. But even though the U.S. Marines and special forces have had an umbrella agreement in place with Saab since 2019 for such munitions and weapons, the gear won’t arrive until 2024.

In Canada, the situation is exacerbated by military leaders and politicians who clearly don’t understand how the defence marketplace works.

Defence Minister Anita Anand has been pushing the message about “getting the defence industry onside” in arming Ukraine. “There is a continued need to provide equipment and military aid to Ukraine, and governments across this world only have so much inventory,” Anand told CBC in June. “And therefore the next step is for industry to see itself as having a role.”

Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Wayne Eyre says the war between Ukraine and Russia should be the catalyst for such a major shift in defence industrial capacity. “I think what this has shown though is we need to increase the capacity of defence industry,” Eyre told the CBC in May. “Given the deteriorating world situation, we need the defence industry to go into a wartime footing and increase their production lines to be able to support the requirements that are out there, whether it’s ammunition, artillery, rockets, you name it. There’s a huge demand out there.”

But Alan Williams, the former assistant deputy minister of materiel at National Defence, said such comments ignore a basic point. Defence firms, he noted, don’t build equipment out of the goodness of their hearts. “They are in it for profit,” Williams said. They have shareholders to satisfy. They want contacts – their attitude is if you want equipment, then sign those contracts.”

If Anand and Eyre want the defence industry to jump in and arm Ukraine then the Canadian government, as well as other NATO nations, will have to directly finance those contracts. Even then, as defence company executives have warned, building modern weapons takes time.