Canada’s military in crisis. Here’s what’s definitely not helping.
Introduction by Newell Durnbrooke
On May 22 the online publication, The Hub, carried an commentary piece by Richard Shimooka. It was titled “Canada’s military in crisis. Here’s what’s definitely not helping.”
You can read the commentary at this link:
https://thehub.ca/2024/05/22/richard-shimooka-canadas-military-is-in-crisis-heres-whats-not-helping/
The commentary initially dealt with the Canadian Surface Combatant program but then focused on what some in the defence community have viewed as a highly personal attack on Alan Williams, the former Assistant Deputy Minister for Materiel at National Defence. In the past, Williams has raised significant concerns about the growing cost of the CSC and how that might affect the Canadian Armed Forces as well as taxpayers.
Williams emailed Harrison Lowman, managing editor of The Hub, a note highlighting his concern over the personal attacks in the commentary as well as providing a rebuttal to the Shimooka piece. He requested it be published. The Hub, after all, claims to be committed to “independent and spirited debate.”
However, Lowman, citing a decision by The Hub’s editorial board, refused to publish the Williams’ rebuttal.
So Esprit de Corps will publish what The Hub won’t. Below is the response from Alan Williams to the commentary piece in The Hub.
By Alan Williams
In his May 2024 commentary "Canada’s Military is in Crisis. Here’s what’s definitely not helping", Richard Shimooka makes reference to a number of my observations. Frankly, I was pleased to see that he is so preoccupied with what I think and say. However, if he is going to critique my comments, he ought to get them right.
Point #1. Mr. Shimooka challenges my assertion that the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) program is unaffordable by relating its cost to Canada’s GDP. But, of course, that comparison is irrelevant. The CSC program is unaffordable within the budget of the Department of National Defence (DND). The reality is that if the CSC and F-35 programs advance as currently structured, without additional funding, DND will incur a $100 billion-dollar capital budget shortfall over the next 10 years.
Point #2. Given the unaffordability of the CSC, Mr. Shimooka criticizes me for not recommending that Canada curtail the navy’s international role. The fact is, for me to do so, would be irresponsible. The government decides on the role and mandate of our military. I am merely pointing out the costs of doing so, with the hope that the government balances its expectations for the armed forces with the funding it provides them.
Point #3. Mr. Shimooka dismisses my recommendations to acquire the CSC at a much lower cost. Apparently Mr. Shimooka feels it is okay to acquire these ships for two to three times their real costs.
Point #4. Mr. Shimooka states that I recommend acquiring the US-built Constellation class vessels. Nothing could be further from the truth. I merely use the Constellation class as a reference point with regard to its cost. Canada is a sovereign country. Our ships should reflect our needs, not those of the US and should be built in Canada.
Point #5. Mr. Shimooka contends that my alternative suggestions offer “superficially compelling ideas with unrealistic timelines and little to no cost saving”. I disagree. I have long suggested limiting the CSC contract to three initial ships and competing the balance. This proposal is sensible and doable. In fact, the notion of signing a contract with Irving Shipbuilding for three ships has been publicly acknowledged by DND. Unlike Mr. Shimooka, I have actually run the procurement system and am confident in the timelines I have suggested. On the other hand, Mr. Shimooka simply buries his head in the sand, ignoring the cost “Titanic iceberg “about to sink the department. His solution is to “dig ourselves out of the mess we find ourselves in, and the most important initial step to solving a problem is seeing it clearly.” It is hard to imagine a less helpful solution than the one he proposes.
