By Richard Lawrence
For those who insist that climate change is not real, they should talk to NATO to see if they feel the same way. In the past, the northern flank of NATO was not given much attention as the main threat, so it was felt, was a land/air threat as Russia came through central Europe. NATO troops were in place to support a delaying action against overwhelming Russian forces to give time to the NATO allies, and in particular the United States, time to move more men/equipment into position to finally halt and push back any incursion. The northern flank was only mildly considered in this scenario as it could be used for flanking maneuvers.
However, recent events have caused the northern flank to be re-examined for defence purposes. Firstly, one must define what makes the northern flank. It used to be the land masses of the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea with the Gulf of Finland (Finland-Estonia) and the Gulf of Bothnia (Sweden-Finland) as interconnected waterways. With Sweden and Finland neutral, the two gulfs would not be breached in a NATO-Russia conflict for fear of bringing those two states into the conflict on NATO’s side which would be disastrous for Russia as both Sweden and Finland have large, modern conventional forces and good military industrial complexes. The Arctic was never an issue as it was frozen most of the year and unnavigable. Therefore, the northern flank was largely the Baltic states and the Baltic Sea.
Global warming has changed some of this. The Arctic is now opening up and is open to bordering countries which include Canada, the United States, and Russia, to name the main contenders. Russia clearly has an advantage in this area as they have had northern population centers for centuries and have built up a substantial infrastructure capable of handling ships. Canada and the USA continue to maintain sovereignty over their Arctic lands but have so far ignored building any infrastructure on these lands which remain, for all intents and purposes, barren and unpopulated. Russia is therefore ready to conduct trade and military operations in the Arctic while NATO can only respond by sending in an aircraft or deploying single naval vessels from far away locations should an incursion happen.
Along with the opening of the Arctic, the Ukraine invasion by Russia along with Russia’s aggressive nature has caused the previously neutral countries of Finland and Sweden to join NATO which gives NATO greater control of the northern waters as well as puts NATO right on Russia’s border (Finland). While this increases NATO’s capability in northern Europe, it also expands the extent of the northern border which NATO must be ready to defend. Russia’s new search for her old Imperial glory is also cause concern for the Baltic states and Poland in the north and I dare say the Balkan states should consider how safe they are.
These are the parameters which the Conference on Security and Defence empanelled four admirals to discuss the northern flank and NATO. The panel moderator was VAdm. (ret’d) Robert Davidson with speakers VAdm. Angus Topshee (Commander Royal Canadian Navy), Adm. Sir Ben Key (First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff – Royal Navy), and VAdm. Jan Kaack (Chief of the German Navy). Each panel member gave an opening address of five to seven minutes and then they were questioned by the moderator about some specific areas.
Adm. Key started off by stating that the Atlantic Ocean was always a means of trade where, occasionally, wars were fought. So, combat on the northern Atlantic is “not about destroying the enemy fleet but more about preserving your freedom of maneuver”. And although the UK still gets about 90% of trade goods by sea, he was more concerned about the 99% of economic data that moves through cables along the sea bed along with threats to energy provided by sea-based windfarms and sea oil/gas rigs.
Unlike land-based facilities, which can be protected and access controlled by virtue of being on sovereign territory, sea-based facilities are located in international water, which are declared free and accessible and, therefore, are harder to secure. It’s harder to secure as anybody can get at it and the threat is not geographically bounded by land borders. The only way to protect these installations is for a deterrent narrative to be so strong that the fear of invoking NATO’s Article 5 causes bad state-actors to pause
Article 5 of the of the NATO Treaty states, in part, that if a NATO country is the victim of an armed attack, each Alliance member will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take such measures as it deems necessary, "including the use of armed force," to come to the aid of the attacked country.
VAdm. Kaack shared some interesting points about Germany’s preparations with regard to consideration of a hybrid fleet including more unmanned naval vehicles (UNV), more use of artificial intelligence and doing multiples activities at once rather than in a serial manner (especially procurement). Some of this is geared to the future in the 35+ planning actions. As for the existing fleet, he noted that there needed to be more availability as there has been occasions when the entire German fleet has been in dry-dock at the same time which, he says, “Is not good”. Also, there are plans to use smaller unmanned systems closer to shore.
But then he started talking about taking more responsibility for certain areas and the need for enhanced co-operation. He suggested that the eight nations that border the Baltic overly their plans and integrate command structures. Perhaps greater co-operation could mean common procurement, common training, etc., and the inherent savings in money, reduced duplication of effort as well as higher availability of trained sailors. Also, some nations may be geared to better handle their specific geography and relieving other nations of that responsibility is a win for everyone.
VAdm. Kaack then elaborated on what he meant by referring to the current German-Norwegian Submarine Co-operation where Germany and Norway have agreed to not only a joint procurement of submarines, but have agreed to not only inter-operability of the submarine fleets but all the way to inter-changeability of ships and sailors. They will purchase the new U212CD (common design) submarines from thyssenkrupp Marine System (thMS) and will share facilities and training with the Lifetime Management Program Office based at Haakonsvern Naval Base in Norway and the Building Program Office in Keil, Germany. Haakonsvern is ideally located near what may be a major theatre of operations as it is close to the Greenland-Iceland-UK Gap (GIUK) which Russian submarines would have to transit to get out into the greater Atlantic Ocean. Sailors will all receive the same training with the possibility that ships will put to sea with mixed nationalities.
Again, higher availability, synergy with NATO countries, cost savings through shared facilities, greater volumes of purchase, and spare parts are only some of the benefits. There is also an increase in the fleet resilience in that ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance are all in dispersed facilities.
It should be noted that Canada has been invited to participate in this program for its new submarine program.
VAdm. Topshee finally got the spotlight and started with a brief overview of how the Convention on the Law of the Sea provides the legal framework for all marine and maritime activities having 169 sovereign states and the European Union as signatories. In short, all waters beyond national boundaries are considered international water. National boundaries used to be limited to three nautical miles (known as the “Cannon Shot Rule” which was the range a shore battery was considered effective) but were increased to 12 nautical miles and out to 200 nautical miles for economic exclusions zones (areas uses for fishing, resources, etc)
It used to be that NATO had a plan to defeat the Soviets and everyone knew what to do. What Kuwait and Iraq showed the world is that one military could destroy another military that was not at the same level. This became a clear signal to adversaries that direct confrontation would not work and that they must go to asymmetric warfare (insurgency, guerilla warfare, rebellion, terrorism – irregular warfare) or nuclear.
He also noted that we used to be protected by the widths of the oceans surrounding us but this is no longer the case. Submarines can park off our shores waiting to launch missiles negating the space provided by the ocean. Some countries can launch land-based missiles that can hit the North American continent. In short, threats can no longer be seen coming in time to react sufficiently.
Canada needs new ships to protect sea lanes, cables, the Arctic, and anti-submarine duties and these are in the procurement cycle. Canada is also asking for 12 submarines which is a drastic increase over the four we had at any time in our country. VAdm. Topshee explained the need for greater numbers of submarines as, previously, “Our submarines have never been for offensive roles or defensive roles but for anti-submarine warfare training”. But now we have threats in three oceans and Canada needs to put submarines in each ocean to control those waters because if you don’t control the waters, they’re not yours. Canada could also use the submarines offensively in that they could stealthily approach another coast and hold them at risk, as well as deter attack and/or retaliate.
When the panel was asked what capabilities they felt they were currently lacking, VAdm. Topshee was the first to take the microphone. He feels Canada and NATO lacks domain awareness which could be alleviated by newer/better over the horizon/polar radars, NORAD modernization will help and sub-surface surveillance, either by manned or autonomous means. Autonomous means is attractive as it allows a vehicle to stay on station longer for a more persistent surveillance and persistence is key in the surveillance. He would also like to see a better communications system in place so that the best weapon for the job can be brought to bear.
For example, he suggested that should an enemy ship come into the Arctic littoral (littorals are shallower coastline areas and, as explained by VAdm. Topshee, “Is where ships come to die”.), it is probably more expedient and cost effective to send in a fighter and drop a bomb on it than it is to try to get a ship into the area to engage the hostile.
VAdm. Kaack suggested that some legal framework needs to be in place to respond the means to do so. NATO also needs resilience, backups, and time to repair.
The next question put to the panel questioned the preparedness for high intensity conflict. Adm. Key started by noting that the Royal Navy had not lost a ship since 1982 when the HMS Sheffield went down in the Falklands. What is lacking since that time is real combat experience for the navy and preparing sailors mentally for the loss of a ship and all hands. They need to understand “The loss of a ship at sea … is not a strategic endgame. That is a tactical outcome of war on the waves.”, and prepare for that eventuality.
There must also be a new communications with industry and government procurement as the current processes take too long as every I must be dotted and T crossed. What both industry and government must be able to do is adapt and work without the safeguards for contractual certainty and not account for every $ spent but to spend it faster. Both must be able to work and adapt not as in peacetime, but as if they were under imminent threat.
VAdm. Topshee added that “It’s not about necessarily having the best ships. It’s about having the best combination of sailors, ships and technology and exploiting those and learning rapidly”
I’ll end my review here as it’s long enough. If you go over to the CPAC website, you can watch the entire discussion under the CDAI 2025 – Day 2 video.
